This page contains theories that join together two or more of variables and describes how these relate to each other in a theoretically interesting way. A theory is seen here as essentially a prediction for what would happen to a dependent variable, or outcome, based on the values of a set of independent variables. The combination of the independent variables and their values is seen as a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the prediction of the value of the outcome. As a result, sesmad theories do not imply their logical inverses, where these are possible (e.g. a theory that states that A leads to B does not ensure that not-A leads to not-B). Theories that serve to act as a type of inverse for each other are classified as being complementary to each other.
Each variable is assigned a role in each theory, and variables can take on the following roles:
- Independent variable: A variable that has some causal effect on another variable
- Underlying independent variable: An independent variable that affects an outcome by affecting another, more proximate cause. Also referred to as a distal cause.
- Proximate independent variable: An independent variable that directly affects an outcome without the help of an intermediary variable. Also referred to as a mediating variable.
- Moderating independent variable: An independent variable that affects an outcome by affecting the relationship between another independent variable and this outcome. This creates what is commonly referred to as an “interaction effect.”
- Outcome:
- Intermediate outcome: An outcome that is affected by the independent variables in a theory, that in turn affects the final outcome (e.g. collective action of a commons user group)
- Final outcome: The final outcome in a theory (e.g. the condition of an environmental commons as it is affected by levels of collective action.)
Additionally, theories can be related to each other in several ways. The following is a list of the types of relationships two theories can have with each other.
- Nested: Theory A contains all of the variables that theory B contains, with either the same values or the inverse set of values.
- Related: (Theory A and B have the same value for the same independent variable and predict the same value for the same final outcome, OR theory A and theory B have different values for the same independent variable and thus predict different values for the same final outcome), AND the two theories do not share the common independent variable via a shared theory that is nested within each.
- Contradictory: Theory A and B have the same value for the same independent variable but predict a different value for the same final outcome. NOTE: because of the principle of equifinality, theories that have different values for the same independent variable and the same value for the same final outcome are not considered to be contradictory.
| Name | Variables |
|---|---|
| Centralization and corruption | Centralization, Leadership accountability, Commons political power, Commons condition trend |
| Rebound effect | Technology role, Commons condition trend |
| Numeric management | Metric diversity, Governance knowledge use, Policy instrument, Compliance, External sanctions, External monitoring, Actor scientific knowledge, Commons condition trend |
| Failure of centralized control | Centralization, External recognition, Governance knowledge use, Institutional diversity, Metric diversity, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend, Commons user mobility, Actor traditional knowledge |
| Crowding in and participation | Participation in rule making, Compliance, Commons condition trend |
| Poverty and resource degradation | Economic status, Commons condition trend |
| Ecological effectiveness of MPAs | External sanctions, External monitoring, Policy instrument, PA IUCN strict zones, Governance system age, MPA internal natural boundaries, Governance system spatial extent, Transaction costs, Compliance, Commons condition trend |
| Political decentralization and fit | Centralization, Governance knowledge use, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| External recognition and local autonomy | External recognition, Compliance, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| Rational depletion of natural resources | Productivity, Property regime, Livelihood alternatives, Commons condition trend |
| Interest heterogeneity and collective action | Interest heterogeneity, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Nested governance | Multiple levels, Commons condition trend |
| Marginalization and degradation | External support, Market scale, Markets, Productivity, Economic status, Economic dependence, Commons condition trend |
| Cultural heterogeneity and collective action | Cultural heterogeneity, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Roving banditry | Commons user mobility, Commons alternatives, Resource market value, Market scale, Markets, Commons feedback visibility use, Transaction costs, Roving bandit, Commons condition trend |
| Market-driven resource decline | Markets, Transaction costs, Resource market value, Market scale, Commons condition trend |
| Borlaug hypothesis and deforestation | Technology role, Productivity, Commons condition trend |
| Decentralization and elite capture | Centralization, Rights granting process, Actor traditional knowledge, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| Decentralization and leakage | Centralization, Social-ecological fit, Scale match, Leakage, Commons condition trend |
| Polycentric comanagement | Participation in rule making, External recognition, Centralization, Commons political power, Horizontal coordination, Multiple levels, Governance knowledge use, Institutional diversity, Actor adaptive capacity, Compliance, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| Accountable leadership | Leadership, Transaction costs, Leadership authority, Leadership accountability, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Environmental kuznets curve | Economic status, Technology role, Commons condition trend |
| Feedbacks and general resilience | Commons feedback visibility use, Commons feedback speed use, Actor adaptive capacity, Ecological resilience, Basin switch |
| Conditions for general resilience | Commons feedback visibility use, Commons feedback speed use, Interest heterogeneity, Cultural heterogeneity, Actor group trust, Institutional diversity, Past collaboration, External Ecological Connectivity, Internal Ecological Connectivity, Metric diversity, Multiple levels, Actor traditional knowledge, Actor scientific knowledge, Leadership, Environmental monitoring, Biodiversity trend, Actor adaptive capacity, Collective action, Transaction costs, Leadership accountability, Leadership authority, Commons condition trend, Ecological resilience, Basin switch |
| Transhumance | Property regime, Commons user mobility, Commons alternatives, Productivity, Inter annual predictability, Intra annual predictability, Commons boundary negotiability, Actor adaptive capacity, Commons condition trend |
| Pigouvian taxes | Policy instrument, Compliance, Transaction costs, External sanctions, External monitoring, Commons condition trend |
| Economic heterogeneity and collective action | Economic heterogeneity, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Private property rights and conservation | Property regime, Transaction costs, Conflict resolution, Property security, Commons condition trend |
| Natural resource dependence | Economic dependence, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Proportionality and collective-action | Proportionality (of costs and benefits), Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Participatory management | Participation in rule making, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| Group size and collective action | Actor group size, Transaction costs, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| User group boundaries | Actor group boundary clarity, Outsider exclusion, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Gilded traps | Resource market value, Biodiversity trend, Commons scarcity, Actor debt, Commons alternatives, Over-capitalization, Actor adaptive capacity, Economic dependence, Ecological resilience, Commons condition trend, Actor vulnerability |
| Bans and perverse incentives | External sanctions, External monitoring, Policy instrument, Perverse incentives, Resource market value, Compliance, Black markets, Commons condition trend |
| Crowding out from external support | External support, Proportionality (of costs and benefits), Commons condition trend |
| Crowding out from external sanctioning | External sanctions, Compliance, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Social memory and general resilience | Actor traditional knowledge, Actor scientific knowledge, Actor adaptive capacity, Ecological resilience, Basin switch |
| Critique of fortress conservation | PA IUCN strict zones, Centralization, Participation in PA siting, Policy instrument, External sanctions, External monitoring, Cultural services condition, User-commons proximity, Participation in rule making, Livelihood alternatives, Leakage, Compliance, User group well-being change, Commons condition trend |
| Collective action and the commons | Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Commons boundaries and collective action | Commons boundaries, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| CAR principles for conservation area design | Policy instrument, PA CAR principles, Commons condition trend |
| Past collaboration and social capital | Past collaboration, Actor group trust, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| The tragedy of the open-access commons | Property regime, Property security, Commons condition trend |
| Forest transition theory | Economic status, Commons condition trend |
| Technical solutions and shifting the burden | Causal level, Technology role, Governance knowledge use, Commons feedback speed use, Commons feedback visibility use, Commons condition trend, Actor vulnerability |
| Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) | Metric diversity, Governance knowledge use, Property regime, Policy instrument, Actor scientific knowledge, Commons condition trend |
| Metric diversity, biodiversity loss and resilience | Metric diversity, Biodiversity trend, Ecological resilience, Basin switch |
| Social diversity and general resilience | Interest heterogeneity, Cultural heterogeneity, Actor adaptive capacity, Ecological resilience, Basin switch |
| Parametric management | Governance knowledge use, Policy instrument, Self monitoring, Transaction costs, Actor traditional knowledge, Compliance, Self Sanctions, Commons condition trend |
| CBNRM design principles | Self Sanctions, Self monitoring, Environmental monitoring, Social-ecological fit, Participation in rule making, Multiple levels, Conflict resolution, Proportionality (of costs and benefits), Commons boundaries, Actor group boundary clarity, External recognition, Outsider exclusion, Compliance, Commons condition trend |
| Decentralization and local capacity | Centralization, External support, Past collaboration, Commons condition trend |
| Enforcement | External monitoring, Self monitoring, External sanctions, Self Sanctions, Transaction costs, Compliance, Commons condition trend |
| Subsidies and perverse incentives | Policy instrument, Perverse incentives, Over-capitalization, Commons condition trend |
| Payment for ecosystem services (PES) | Policy instrument, Compliance, External monitoring, Transaction costs, Property security, External sanctions, Commons condition trend |
| Social-ecological fit theory | Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| Local livelihood and protected areas | Policy instrument, User group well-being change, Cultural services condition, Commons condition trend |
| Centralized conservation | Policy instrument, PA IUCN strict zones, Centralization, User-commons proximity, External monitoring, Transaction costs, Compliance, External sanctions, Commons condition trend |
| Conflict resolution and collective action | Conflict resolution, Transaction costs, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Transaction costs and collective action | Transaction costs, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) | Interest heterogeneity, Cultural heterogeneity, Economic dependence, User-commons proximity, Governance knowledge use, Centralization, Actor group size, Property regime, Personal communication, Commons feedback visibility use, Actor group trust, Social-ecological fit, Commons condition trend |
| Ecolabels | Policy instrument, Compliance, External sanctions, External monitoring, Transaction costs, Commons condition trend |
| Communication and collective action | Personal communication, Actor group trust, Collective action, Commons condition trend |
| Name | Variables |