Critique of fortress conservation
- Variable relationship:
As a model for protected area-based conservation, fortress conservation (as described in the theory entitled Centralized Conservation) is defined in the Sage encyclopedia of Environment and Society (Robbins 2007; see also Brockington 2002) as the following:
"Fortress conservation is a conservation model based on the belief that biodiversity protection is best achieved by creating protected areas where ecosystems can function in isolation from human disturbance. Fortress, or protectionist, conservation assumes that local people use natural resources in irrational and destructive ways, and as a result cause biodiversity loss and environmental degradation. Protected areas following the fortress model can be characterized by three principles: local people dependent on the natural resource base are excluded; enforcement is implemented by park rangers patrolling the boundaries, using a “fines and fences” approach to ensure compliance; and only tourism, safari hunting, and scientific research are considered as appropriate uses within protected areas. Because local people are labeled as criminals, poachers, and squatters on lands they have occupied for decades or centuries, they tend to be antagonistic toward fortress-style conservation initiatives and less likely to support the conservation goals."
In the language of sesmad variables, fortress conservation occurs when you have a highly centralized (Centralization) protected area (Policy Instrument) that creates a protected area (Policy Instrument) that strictly prohibits user access (PA IUCN Strict Zones; User-commons Proximity), with monitoring and strong sanctions by the government (External Monitoring; External Sanctions).
Critics of this approach (Brockington 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2002) have emphasized that these processes are done without including local users in important decisions (Participation in PA Sitting, Participation in Rule Making). This can cause former local resource users to become “conservation refugees” with few livelihood alternatives (Livelihood Alternatives) and few incentives to comply with PA rules (Compliance), and who experience a drastic decline in welfare (User Group Well-being Change). States, meanwhile, rarely have the monitoring and enforcement capacity to control large swaths of land without local support (much less with local antagonism), hence leading to so-called “paper parks”, where conservation areas exist only in a legal document (Stolton and Dudley 1999; Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). Hence, if and when a government or NGO can effectively control the boundaries of a protected area, the outcome can be that degradation simply shifts to the outside of the protected area, in what is termed “spillover effects” or leakage (Leakage) (Forcada et al. 2009). The final result is that the condition of the commons is predicted to decline (Commons Condition Trend).- Project
- SESMAD
- Sector(s)
- Scientific Field
- Component Type(s)
- Status
- Public
Variables
Variable | Role | Role Explanation | Value |
---|---|---|---|
Policy instrument | Underlying independent variable | Fortress conservation applies to protected area-based governance systems. | Protected area |
PA IUCN strict zones | Underlying independent variable | The PA falls into the following IUCN category: Ia: Category Ia are strictly protected areas set aside to protect biodiversity and also possibly geological/geomorphological features, where human visitation, use and impacts are strictly controlled and limited to ensure protection of the conservation values. | 100% |
Centralization | Underlying independent variable | The approach of forest conservation has taken place within highly centralized governance systems. | Highly centralized |
Participation in PA siting | Underlying independent variable | The designation of the protected area is done without the consultation of local user groups. | Low |
Livelihood alternatives | Proximate independent variable | The removal of local user groups is exacerbated by the general absence of livelihood alternatives. | Cannot access alternatives |
External sanctions | Proximate independent variable | Centralized agencies sanction infractions of PA rules | Yes |
External monitoring | Proximate independent variable | Centralized agencies monitor for infractions of PA rules | Yes |
Cultural services condition | Proximate independent variable | As a result of being pushed out of the commons and culturally important sites on which they depend, local user groups shall experience substantial declines in their sense of identity or community cohesion. | Improved |
User-commons proximity | Proximate independent variable | As a result of the implementation of the PA, local users groups are pushed out of the commons to ensure that they don't over-use it. | No |
Participation in rule making | Proximate independent variable | Following the designation of the protected area, local users are given little chance to participate politically in the rules regarding the use of natural resources within its boundaries. | Low |
User group well-being change | Intermediate outcome | As a result of being marginalized and pushed out of the commons on which they depend, local user groups with few livelihood alternatives frequently experience substantial declines in their well-being. | Worsened |
Leakage | Intermediate outcome | Users that are banned from using the reosurce within the conservation area shall over-exploit neighboring areas that would not be over-exploited otherwise | Yes leakage of costs |
Compliance | Intermediate outcome | Compliance is predicted to be low. | Low |
Commons condition trend | Final outcome | As a result of negative human well-being and lack of participation and voice of people, non-compliance is a problem, resulting in failure of the fortress conservation approach. | Remained the same or worsened. |
Related Theories
Theory | Relationship | Characterizing Variables |
---|---|---|
Failure of centralized control | related | |
Enforcement | contradictory | |
Ecological effectiveness of MPAs | contradictory | |
Crowding out from external sanctioning | related | |
Local livelihood and protected areas | contains | |
Crowding in and participation | contains | |
Centralized conservation | contradictory | |
Political decentralization and fit | related | |
Centralization and corruption | related | |
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) | related | |
Bans and perverse incentives | related |