Crowding out from external sanctioning
- Variable relationship:
Motivation crowding theory (Frey and Jegen 2001) suggests that externally imposed sanctions (External Sanctions) as solutions to environmental dilemmas that standard theory predict would improve social welfare do not (Cardenas et al. 2000; Vollan 2008). This occurs because individuals confronted with the regulation begin to exhibit less other-regarding behavior (Collective Action) and made choices that are more self-interested resulting in less rule compliance (Compliance), which jeopardizes the effects of rules on resource conservation (Commons Condition Trend).
This theory has been also referred as "Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out".
- Scientific Field
- Component Type(s)
|External sanctions||Underlying independent variable||Sanctions that are imposed by external actors may crowd-out intrinsic and pro-social motivations; causing individuals to respond more to short-term economic factors and therefore fail to cooperate to manage resources or comply with rules.||Yes|
|Collective action||Intermediate outcome||External sanctioning that supersedes intrinsic motivation to cooperate translates into lower cooperation levels than would be expected.||Low|
|Compliance||Intermediate outcome||External sanctioning that supersedes intrinsic motivation to cooperate translates into lower compliance levels than would be expected.||No|
|Commons condition trend||Final outcome||Declining compliance and collective action is likely to lead to over-extraction of the resource||Worsened|
|Collective action and the commons||contains|
|Bans and perverse incentives||related|
|Critique of fortress conservation||related|