Crowding out from external support
- Variable relationship:
Gibson et al. (2005) refer to situations in which external support, e.g., foreign financial aid to developing countries, state promoted projects for natural resource use at local levels, such as irrigation systems (External Support), run the risk of crowding out exisisting or potential local self-organized initiatives and responsibility (Collective Action).
A lack of proportionality (Proportionality) between the benefits (higher) and costs (lower) of infrastructure or institutional development for natural resource use may result in a misperception of the actual costs of such investments among the beneficiaries. This, in turn, will motivate irresponsible behavior towards the use and long term maintenance of that infrastructure, institutions, and/or resources (Commons Condition Trend).
This theory is also referred to as the Samaritan's dilemma, and is a complex theory.
- Scientific Field
- Component Type(s)
|External support||Underlying independent variable||External support may introduce distortions in perceptions and common understandings of costs and benefits of cooperation and this in turn shall crowd out the eagerness of beneficiaries to invest in cooperation.||Extensive support|
|Proportionality (of costs and benefits)||Proximate independent variable||Disproportionately high benefits compared to the costs of providing common goods (e.g., institutions and infrastructure for natural resource use) shall result in shortsighted behavior and/or vested interests/resistances about need to contribute to those goods.||No|
|Commons condition trend||Final outcome||As a result of low levels of collective action; the conditions of the commons worsens.||Worsened|
|Marginalization and degradation||related|
|Proportionality and collective-action||contains|