Interest heterogeneity and collective action
- Variable relationship:
Vedeld (2000) argues that when groups have heterogenous interests (Interest Heterogeneity,) that the llikelihood that a group will be able to successfully self-organize is reduced (Collective Action) by increasing the costs of reaching and implementing agreements, and therefore the likelihood of successful environmental governance is also reduced (Commons Condition Trend).
- Project
- SESMAD
- Sector(s)
- Scientific Field
- Component Type(s)
- Status
- Public
Variables
| Variable | Role | Role Explanation | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interest heterogeneity | Proximate independent variable | High levels of heterogeneity of interests increases the transaction costs of reaching and implementing agreements, reducing levels of collective action. | High |
| Collective action | Intermediate outcome | High levels of heterogeneity of interests increases the transaction costs of reaching and implementing agreements, reducing levels of collective action. | Low |
| Commons condition trend | Final outcome | As a result of low levels of collective action, the conditions of the commons worsen. | Worsened |
Related Theories
| Theory | Relationship | Characterizing Variables |
|---|---|---|
| Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) | nested | |
| Social diversity and general resilience | contradictory | |
| Collective action and the commons | contains |