Enforcement
- Variable relationship:
Ostrom (1990) discusses the importance of this theory as two separate (essentially monitoring and sanctioning) principles to successful CBNRM. In Gibson (2000) these two processes are united into one principle for successful management. This argument is broadly based on findings from traditional common-pool resource work (Coleman 2009; Cox 2014) and on standard environmental economics theory (Kolstad 2000; Goodstein 2008). In both cases, it is argued that monitoring and sanctioning processes (Self Monitoring; Self Sanctions; External Monitoring; External Sanctions) are needed to ensure that rules are complied with (Compliance). If this can be done in a cost-effective way (Transaction Costs), the commons can be preserved (Commons Condition Trend).
This theory includes both "self" and "external" monitoring and sanctioning, without distinguishing between these two basic types of enforcement. In the literature on community-based management (see Ostrom 1990), the emphasis is usually on self-monitoring and self-sanctioning (and see the theory "Crowding out from external sanctions" for an argument that the difference between these types of enforcement is significant).
- Project
- SESMAD
- Sector(s)
- Scientific Field
- Component Type(s)
- Status
- Public
Variables
| Variable | Role | Role Explanation | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self Sanctions | Proximate independent variable | Sanctioning is an important follow-up activity to monitoring to ensure that the benefits of rule-breaking are negated. | Yes (or substituted with external sanctioning) |
| External monitoring | Proximate independent variable | Monitoring of a commons user group (by themselves or by another group) is critically important to sustain high levels of collective action. | Yes (or substituted with self monitoring) |
| External sanctions | Proximate independent variable | Sanctioning is an important follow-up activity to monitoring to ensure that the benefits of rule-breaking are negated. | Yes (or substituted with self sanctioning) |
| Self monitoring | Proximate independent variable | Monitoring of a commons user group (by themselves or by another group) is critically important to sustain high levels of collective action. | Yes (or substituted with external monitoring) |
| Transaction costs | Moderating independent variable | Enforcement is much more effective if it is done in a way that keeps transaction costs low. | Low |
| Compliance | Intermediate outcome | The presence of monitoring and sanctioning increases compliance with rules regarding the use of a commons. | Yes |
| Commons condition trend | Final outcome | Compliance with rules regarding a commons helps to maintain the condition of this commons. | Remained the same or improved |
Related Theories
| Theory | Relationship | Characterizing Variables |
|---|---|---|
| Parametric management | nested | |
| Ecological effectiveness of MPAs | nested | |
| Centralized conservation | nested | |
| Payment for ecosystem services (PES) | nested | |
| Ecolabels | nested | |
| CBNRM design principles | nested | |
| Numeric management | nested | |
| Bans and perverse incentives | contradictory | |
| Crowding out from external sanctioning | contradictory | |
| Pigouvian taxes | nested | |
| Critique of fortress conservation | contradictory |