Collective action and the commons
- Variable relationship:
This theory is fundamental to the work on common-pool resource governance (see Poteete et al 2010). Much of this work attempts to explain collective action, and the motivation for this is the theoretically positive relationship between collective action (Collective Action) and commons outcomes (Commons Condition Trend). Much of the work on the commons assumes this relationship, although some work (see Agrawal and Chhatre 2008) explicitly attempts to test it.
- Project
- SESMAD
- Sector(s)
- Scientific Field
- Component Type(s)
- Status
- Public
Variables
| Variable | Role | Role Explanation | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collective action | Proximate independent variable | High collective action is presumed to be necessary (if not sufficient) for the maintenance of common-pool resources. | High |
| Commons condition trend | Final outcome | With sufficient levels of collective action, it is supposed that commons users can internalize externalities and prevent the over-use of the commons. | Remained the same or improved |
Related Theories
| Theory | Relationship | Characterizing Variables |
|---|---|---|
| Commons boundaries and collective action | nested | |
| Crowding out from external sanctioning | nested | |
| Cultural heterogeneity and collective action | nested | |
| Past collaboration and social capital | nested | |
| Proportionality and collective-action | nested | |
| Transaction costs and collective action | nested | |
| User group boundaries | nested | |
| Economic heterogeneity and collective action | nested | |
| Natural resource dependence | nested | |
| Communication and collective action | nested | |
| Interest heterogeneity and collective action | nested |