|Variable Component Type||Governance System|
|Theme||Institutions (learn about themes)|
|Projects||SESMAD, Fiji fisheries|
|Question||Is this governance system highly centralized or highly decentralized?|
|Select Options||1 Highly decentralized, 2 Somewhat decentralized, 3 Somewhat centralized, 4 Highly centralized|
|Importance||The extent to which a governance system is centralized or not has large effects on how decisions are made and thus how the commons is managed and what outcomes are achieved.|
A centralized governance system has few actors/actor groups that hold a disproportionate amount of authority of over actors or parts of a commons. More decentralized governance systems have flatter hierarchies.
Highly decentralized: The decision-making authority with respect to a commons lies primarily within individual users.
Somewhat decentralized: The decision-making authority with respect to a commons lies primarily within communities of users.
Somewhat centralized: The decision-making authority with respect to a commons lies primarily within some form of regional governance unit (a district, municipality, province/state, special district)
Highly centralized: The decision-making authority with respect to a commons lies primarily within a national government or centralized bureaucracy.
|Failure of centralized control||Highly centralized|
|Polycentric comanagement||Somewhat decentralized|
|Centralized conservation||Highly centralized|
|Critique of fortress conservation||Highly centralized|
|Decentralization and leakage||Highly decentralized|
|Political decentralization and fit||Value of variable moves from more to less centralized|
|Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)||Somewhat decentralized|
|Centralization and corruption||Highly centralized|
|Decentralization and elite capture||Highly decentralized|
|Decentralization and local capacity||Highly to somewhat decentralized|
Andersson, Krister P, and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. "Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective." Policy sciences 41 (1):71-93.
|"New Order" Indonesian Forest Governance System, 1965-1998||Highly centralized (4)||The governance system centered in an individual dictator who centralized power around him and was supported by a very close group of extremely loyal allies. Important decisions were made by Suharto or by government agencies working under him (following his orders) and based in Jakarta, the capital city.|
|"Reformasi" Indonesian Forest Governance System, 1998-2012||Somewhat decentralized (2)||After the fall of Suharto, the government of Indonesia has undergone various changes related to decentralization, both political and administrative. Competitive legislative elections began in 1999, marking the beginning of a multi-party political system with a less powerful central presidency. In 2001, the government began a devolution of power to the regions through decentralization and regional autonomy. Pepinsy (2012) argues that since then, "Indonesian politics ceased to be “about” Reformasi (despite the continued ubiquity of the term in political speech) and started being “about” the division of political authority in the center versus the regions, in contrast to the steep hierarchy with Jakarta at the top and the regions at the bottom." Although this program was not complete, and was also partially rolled back after 2004, it nonetheless shifted significant powers from central to relatively more local actors (provinces and districts). In some cases, local communities with proof of ownership have obtained the rights of management, and in some regions such as East Kalimantan are permitting communities to manage small-scale forest areas in cooperatives. Moreover, in some national protected areas there have been pilot collaborative governance arrangements with communities. However, overall most communities still have very little say in forest management. On the other hand, the new, more independent court system has also been an important venue for channeling local claims over forest rights, although to date decisions have not favored decentralization. For instance, the Dayak used the court system to ask for the withdrawal of concessions in West Kalimantan and seek retributions from loss of timber benefits, and environmental and cultural damages from these concessions; many villagers have brought this type of challenge during the Reformasi (Potter, 2009). For more details on this partial decentralization, see e.g. Ardiansyah & Jotzo (2013), Arnold (2008), McCarthy (2004).|
|Wakatobi National Park 2008-current||Somewhat decentralized (2)||Policy in Indonesia shifted to be more decentralized (in 1999), central government set budgets, but local governments able to decide how to spend, lots of NGO involvement|
|Caeté-Taperaçú Extractive Reserve (RESEX) in Brazil||Somewhat decentralized (2)|
|Sasi in Tomolol, Misool|
|ICCAT Governance System||Highly centralized (4)||ICCAT sets regulations that apply to all contracting parties (although they can opt out of regulations). Quotas and regulations are negotiated by contracting parties, but total and national quotas are set by the international body with little room for adjustment (unless they are more strict than required) by nation states and regions.|
|GMR governance system 1998-current||Somewhat decentralized (2)||Many actor groups take part in management of the GMR, participatory management is a management principle of the GMR.|
|Montreal Protocol||Highly centralized (4)|
|Pre-Montreal Protocol Ozone Governance||Highly decentralized (1)||Any governance of ozone depleting substances was either highly idiosyncratic or non-existent, governed only by market forces. The US for instance banned the nonessential use of CFSs as aerosol propellants in 1978.|
|Rhine Chemicals Convention||Somewhat centralized (3)||The ICPR Secretariat concentrates all administrative and operational decision making power; the ICPR Secretariat is however accountable and regularly steered by ICPR members|
|Rhine Action Plan||Somewhat centralized (3)||The ICPR Secretariat concentrates all administrative and operational decision making power; the ICPR Secretariat is however accountable and regularly steered by ICPR members|
|GBR Marine Park Act 1975-1999||Highly centralized (4)||This is a government act, highly centralized.|
|GBR Marine Park Act 2004-current||Highly centralized (4)||This is a government act, highly centralized.|
|NWHI Monument Act 2006||Highly centralized (4)||the governance system is highly centralized because the co-trusteeship is composed of state and federal government bodies.|
|Magnuson-Stevens Act||Highly centralized (4)|
|Raja Ampat Governance System||Somewhat decentralized (2)||Raja Ampat Regency - officially managed under the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, but management is shared between local communtiies and local governement with support from International NGOs (TNC + CI)|
|Macquarie Island Toothfish Fishery Management Plan||Highly centralized (4)||Decisions are made by the national government|
|Joint Sanctuary Management Governance System||Highly centralized (4)||Federal government oversees and regulates the sanctuaries.|
|Macquarie Island Nature Reserve Management Plan||Highly centralized (4)|
|Community D Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Community A Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Community C Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Community B Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery Management Plan||Somewhat centralized (3)||The Pacific Council is regional (includes Oregon, Washington, California, and Idaho), while NMFS is regional-focused it is a federal agency, and the California Department of Fish and Wildlife is a state based agency.|
|Svalbard Environmental Protection Act||Highly centralized (4)||Regulations were instituted from the central government, and local people/users did not have direct input into the regulations.|
|Seaflower MPA Act 2005||Highly decentralized (1)||The passage of the congressional law in 1993 established the National Environment System (SINA) that decentralized environmental management in Colombia through the creation of 34 regional autonomous agencies (CARs). Each of them is responsible for managing the environment and natural resources within its jurisdiction.|
|Community G Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Community H Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Community E Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Community F Governance System||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Galapagos Governance System 1998-current||Somewhat centralized (3)||Participatroy Management Board includes users (fisher and tourism) plus government. Final and over-riding decision with IMA, which is national governement, so coded as 'somewhat centralized'|
|Macquarie Island Marine Park Management Plan||Highly centralized (4)||Governance is controlled heavily by major state bodies, most notably, the Department of the Environment. As there is no resident population, the level of centralization is unsurprising.|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Plan of Management 2000 - 2005 and Management Plan 2005 - 2012||Somewhat centralized (3)||The Director of National Parks is responsible under the EPBC Act for the administration, management and control of Commonwealth reserves and conservation zones. The Director is assisted in performing this function by the staff of Parks Australia. A Steering Committee of Australian and South Australian government agencies guides the day-to-day management of the Great Australian Bight Marine Park. However, the Director retains direct control of the Great Australian Bight Marine Park (Commonwealth Waters). At the time of preparation of the 2005 - 2012 Management Plan, the committee consisted of representatives from the following agencies: -Australian Government Department of the Environment and Heritage -South Australian Department for Environment and Heritage -Primary Industries and Resources South Australia District Council of Ceduna -South Australian Tourism Commission -Australian Fisheries Management Authority At the time of preparation of the 2005 - 2012 Plan, a non-government Consultative Committee advised the Australian and South Australian governments about management of the Great Australian Bight Marine Park. The Consultative Committee represents general community interests, Indigenous interests, commercial interests and scientific interests in the Park and the State Park. It is intended to broaden the Consultative Committee to include representatives of the petroleum industry.|
|Heard and McDonald Islands Marine Reserve Management Plan||Highly centralized (4)||Governance is controlled almost entirely by major state bodies, especially the Department of the Environment.|
|Heard Island and McDonald Islands Fishery Management Plan||Highly centralized (4)||Decisions are ultimately made by AFMA (the national government).|
|Cenderwasih governance system||Somewhat decentralized (2)||Policy in Indonesia shifted to be more decentralized (in 1999). In 2002, following a special autonomy law granted for Papua the right to resource management moved from national to local responsibility. In reality the park seems fairly centralised, with data and reports at central government level (from discussions with WWF)|
|The Falkland Islands Government (FIG) Fisheries Department’s Falklands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ)||Highly centralized (4)||The Fisheries Department is a government agency based primarily in Stanley and oversees the entire territory's fisheries. While they consult with local users, mostly up to the management body.|
|California Department of Fish and Wildlife Market Squid Fishery Management Plan||Somewhat centralized (3)||State government makes the decisions, but federal government makes larger over arching fishery decisions (e.g. dictates larger policies).|
|New Zealand Quota Management System||Highly centralized (4)||New Zealand’s Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) is the agency currently responsible for management of fisheries. The Ministry’s role is to act as the Government’s principal adviser on New Zealand’s fisheries management and the impacts of fishing on the aquatic environment.|
|Indonesian Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture||Somewhat decentralized (2)|
|Self.organized rules and norms for SCUBA diving||Highly decentralized (1)|
|Marine Areas for Responsible Fishing (AMPRs) Costa Rica||Somewhat decentralized (2)|
Basic:A basic variable describes essential and basic background information for a component.
Biophysical:Biophysical variables describe just that: important biophysical properties, largely of environmental commons, that are not captured by a more specific theme.
Causation:A variable with this theme describes issues of causality, which is a complex subject. Most basically this theme is associated with variables that describe different types of causation and different types of causes of environmental problems.
Context:contextual variable relates the component with which it associated to the social and/or ecological setting of a particular interaction and/or case.
Ecosystem services:Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or describe the provision of important ecosystem services by a natural resource.
Enforcement:Enforcement involves several different processes, including monitoring for violations of rules, sanctioning violators, and conflict resolution mechanisms involved in this process. Variables that relate to any of these processes should be attached to this theme.
External:Variables with this theme relate a component to processes external to the case with which the component is associated.
Heterogeneity:Variables with this theme describe important ways in which the member of an actor group differ from each other.
Incentives: This theme is associated with variables that are not directly related to institutions and rules, but which still play a role in affecting the incentives that commons users have to ameliorate or exacerbate the commons they use.
Institutional-biophysical linkage:This is a sub-theme of the institutions theme, and describes those variables that ask about the relationship between a set of institutions and a biophysical aspect of a commons.
Institutions:Variables with this theme describe the social institutions (rules, property rights) that are used to organize and direct human behavior. It does not include monitoring and enforcement of these institutions, as these are associated with the Enforcement theme.
Knowledge and uncertainty:Variables with this theme describe levels of knowledge that actor groups have regarding a commons, as well as factors that affect how much uncertainty there is in the status and dynamics of that commons.
Leadership:Leaders play an important role in commons management, most traditionally by providing for public goods needed to organize commons users. But there are other possible roles, and variables associated with this theme can relate to any role that a leader might play in an interaction.
Outcomes:This theme is attached to variables that deal with any outcomes that are produced by the actions of relevant actors in an interaction.
Resource renewability:Variables associated with this theme deal with the ability of a natural resource to be highly productive and renewable.
Social capital:Social capital captures the processes that enable the members of an actor group to work effectively together. Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or in some way express the level of social capital among members of a group.
Spatial:Variables associated with the Spatial theme describe important spatial patterns or dynamics, such as the spatial heterogeneity of a commons, or whether or not a user group resides within a particular commons.
Technology:This theme is attached to variables that consider the role that technology and infrastructure have in affecting commons outcomes.