| Variable Type | Ordinal |
|---|---|
| Variable Component Type | Actor |
| Variable Kind | Interaction |
| Theme | Outcomes (learn about themes) |
| Projects | SESMAD |
| Question | What is the current level of collective action within the members of this actor group with respect to the use or management of this commons? |
| Select Options | 1 Low, 2 Medium, 3 High |
| Unit | |
| Role | CommonsUser |
| Importance | Collective action is an important dependent variable in many traditional common-pool resource analyses. It in turn is seen as a centrally determining factor in whether or not a user group is capable of sustainably using a commons. |
| Definition | Marshall (1998) has defined collective action as "the action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests." |
| Sectors |
Theory Usages
Associated Studies
| Study Citation |
|---|
Marshall, Gordon. 1998. A Dictionary of Sociology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. |
Case Usages
| Case | Interaction Type | Component | Value Used | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Indonesian "Adat" Communities | ||
| Montreal Protocol | Governance | Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers | Low (1) | Limited collective action over this snapshot. |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR recreational fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Low (1) | Mostly focused on realising private goods. Some participation in Guardian Reef Fishers to promote reef stewardship. |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Medium (2) | Mostly focused on realising private goods. Some participation in Guardian Reef Fishers to promote reef stewardship. |
| Montreal Protocol | Governance | Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers | Low (1) | Little collective action is necessary throughout the early part of this time period. Later on industrial producers tended to take individual actions to lobby their respective governments. |
| Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR) | Governance | Galapagos Artisan Fishermen | Low (1) | The current level will be low because the fishery is now closed. It would have been high at the start of the time period because fishers self-organised cooperatives, holding formal and informal meetings to enure they got the fishery outcomes they wanted - including through strikes and causing high profile conflicts. Collective action was focussed on rights to fish rather than conservation or sustainability. |
| Wakatobi National Park | Governance | Wakatobi Bajau fishers | High (3) | The Bajau are a highly cohesive group and will work together to exploit the commons - but not manage it as conservation/management of resources is not part of their cultural norms |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Sanctuary Recreational Users | Low (1) | Little collective action is needed |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Academic Researchers | Low (1) | Little collective action is necessary |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | High (3) | Communities work together to manage natural resources, including traditional management practices |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | High (3) | Involved in local management and following of traditional natural resource management |
| Svalbard Nature Reserves | Governance | Svalbard Tourism | High (3) | AECO membership |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Groundfish Fishermen | Medium (2) | Risk pool groups are a form of collective action where individual fishermen pool their quotas to ensure they individually do not go over the fishery allotment and close it or are sanctioned for doing so. However, this is not the entire groundfish fishery. |
| Svalbard Nature Reserves | Governance | Svalbard Shrimp Fishers | Low (1) | All fishers follow regulations, but there does not appear to be any collective action towards the managementof the commons |
| Heard and McDonald Islands Marine Reserve | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | High (3) | Collective Action is high between legal toothfish fishers based on their capacity to come together (with governments, NGOs, the industry, international bodies, and others) to combat and dramatically reduce illegal fishing (see e.g., Osterblom et al. 2015, Osterblom and Sumaila 2011, Osterblom and Bodin 2012). |
| Great Australian Bight Marine Park (GABMP) (Commonwealth Waters) | Governance | GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Seaflower MPA | Governance | Seaflower artisanal fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Seaflower MPA | Governance | Seaflower artisanal fishers | High (3) | They seemed to be united during the creation of the MPA. |
| Cenderwasih National Park | Governance | Cenderwasih fishers | Medium (2) | Based on Melanesian society there is likely to be local collective action for resource management, but this is not part of the formal management of the MPA |
| Falkland Islands squid | Governance | Patagonian Squid Trawlers | Medium (2) | FIFCA helps bring interests to be heard. Work together to bring common interests to managers. |
| New Zealand squid | Governance | New Zealand Arrow Squid Fishers | High (3) | Very high. DWG decides rules and enforces them, even if there is no legal aspect to these industry created rules. Long history of industry working together to get in front of issues and manage issues (e.g. sea lion incidental catch) themselves. |
| California squid | Governance | California market squid fishermen | High (3) | Fishers coordinate frequently, most power through CWPA. |
| Pond aquaculture on Lombok, Indonesia | Governance | Lombok aquaculture farmers | Low (1) | |
| Pond aquaculture on Lombok, Indonesia | Governance | Lombok aquaculture farmers | ||
| Caete-Teperacu Extractive Reserve (RESEX) in Braganca, Brazil | Governance | Association of Users in the Caete-Teperacu RESEX (ASSUREMACATA) in Brazil | Low (1) | High in the 1990s to establish common property rights but now low. |
| Gili Trawangan Coastal Tourism | Governance | SCUBA diving businesses on Gili Trawangan | High (3) | |
| Gili Trawangan Coastal Tourism | Governance | Gili Indah Dive Association (GIDA) | High (3) | All governance has been self-organized |
| Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica fisheries governance | Governance | Isla Caballo AMPR Costa Rica | Low (1) | |
| Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica fisheries governance | Governance | Palito-Montero AMPR Costa Rica | High (3) | |
| Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica fisheries governance | Governance | Paquera-Tambor AMPR Costa Rica | Medium (2) | |
| Cenderwasih National Park | Governance | Cenderwasih fishers | Medium (2) | Based on Melanesian society there is likely to be local collective action for resource management, but this is not part of the formal management of the MPA |
| Macquarie Island Marine Park | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | High (3) | Group has organized alongside other toothfish operators to form the coalition of legal toothfish operators. |
| Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR) | Governance | Galapagos Tourism Sector | High (3) | Tourism is generally considered to be well managed. Also the International Galapagos Tour Operators Association aims to ensure tourism is a positive force in the Galapagos: http://www.igtoa.org/igtoa_in_action |
| Wakatobi National Park | Governance | Wakatobi Bajau fishers | High (3) | The Bajau are a highly cohesive group and will work together to exploit the commons - but not manage it as conservation/management of resources is not part of their cultural norms |
| Wakatobi National Park | Governance | Wakatobi Bajau fishers | High (3) | The Bajau are a highly cohesive group and will work together to exploit the commons - but not manage it as conservation/management of resources is not part of their cultural norms |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Academic Researchers | Low (1) | Little collective action is necessary |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Tourism | Not Applicable | |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | High (3) | |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR recreational fishers | Low (1) | Most recreational fishers are not part of representative organisations |
| Great Australian Bight Marine Park (GABMP) (Commonwealth Waters) | Governance | GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | High (3) | Fishers follow guidelines for southern right whale and are part of collective action via the Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Industry Association: http://www.asbtia.com.au/ |
| Great Australian Bight Marine Park (GABMP) (Commonwealth Waters) | Governance | GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | High (3) | Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Industry Association: http://www.asbtia.com.au/ |
| Macquarie Island Marine Park | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | High (3) | Group has self-organized with other toothfish fishers to prevent harvests by illegal operators and achieve MSC certification of some fisheries. |
| Heard and McDonald Islands Marine Reserve | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | High (3) | The HIMI toothfish fishers have self-organized with other toothfish fishers to prevent harvests by illegal operators (e.g., COLTO) and to achieve MSC certification. Both of these actions have potentially helped albatross through reduced IUU (and theoretically resulting in reduced seabird catch) and through the MSC guidelines, which require that vessels minimize and eliminate seabird interactions. |
| Svalbard Nature Reserves | Governance | Svalbard Tourism | High (3) | Members of AECO follow strict guidelines above and beyond international and national laws in accordance with AECO objectives http://www.aeco.no/membership/ |