|Variable Component Type||Actor|
|Theme||Incentives (learn about themes)|
|Question||Is there general proportionality between the amount of costs group members incur and the amount of benefits received?|
|Importance||CPR theory argues that individuals are more likely to continually invest in costly activities needed for cooperation, including monitoring and rule-making when they perceive themselves to derive sufficient and equivalent benefits from their actions (Cox et al. 2010).|
Actors incur costs when they act collectively. These can be related to both time and money. They also gain benefits from this. Proportionality refers to a judgement that costs and benefits are balanced in a way that is expected and considered legitimate by members of the group.
|CBNRM design principles||Yes|
|Crowding out from external support||No|
|Proportionality and collective-action||Yes|
|Galapagos Artisan Fishermen||Yes||Fishermen are part of cooperatives and during the peak fishery were involved in many meetings and protests, this would have involved considerable time but they got the outcomes they wanted so coded as yes. Currently the fishery is closed, but there was a commitment to convert fishing permits into tourism permits.|
|"New Order" Indonesian Central Government (1965-1998)||No||While certain members of the government (particularly family members and military and business leaders with close ties to Suharto) received most of the benefits of the system, in the form of privileged access to forest concessions - they incurred few costs. Costs were largely borne by those dependent on forests for their subsistence, or by the natural systems themselves.|
|Indonesian "Adat" Communities||Missing in case|
|Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia||No||? Not sure how to code this|
|Indonesian District Governments||missing in case|
|"Reformasi" Indonesian Central Government (1998-2012)||Missing in case|
|Indonesian Local entrepreneurs||?|
|Civil society organizations in Indonesia||Missing in case|
|ICCAT Contracting Parties||Yes||There is some proportionality between contributions to ICCAT and the amount of benefits, however, not included in these costs are the monitoring costs that are performed at the National Level. In any case 4 groups are identified, Parties identified as developed market economies pay the most, while payments by non-developed economies depend upon combinations of their GNP and catches. The poorest countries with catches below 5000t pay 0.25% of the budget each, while countries that exceed GNP of 2,000 or harvest more than 5000t pay 3,00% each.|
|ICCAT Western Members||Yes||There is some proportionality between contributions to ICCAT and the amount of benefits, however, not included in these costs are the monitoring costs that are performed at the National Level. In any case 4 groups are identified, Parties identified as developed market economies pay the most, while payments by non-developed economies depend upon combinations of their GNP and catches. The poorest countries with catches below 5000t pay 0.25% of the budget each, while countries that exceed GNP of 2,000 or harvest more than 5000t pay 3,00% each.|
|ICCAT Eastern Members||Yes||There is some proportionality between contributions to ICCAT and the amount of benefits, however, not included in these costs are the monitoring costs that are performed at the National Level. In any case 4 groups are identified, Parties identified as developed market economies pay the most, while payments by non-developed economies depend upon combinations of their GNP and catches. The poorest countries with catches below 5000t pay 0.25% of the budget each, while countries that exceed GNP of 2,000 or harvest more than 5000t pay 3,00% each.|
|Ozone Nation States||Yes|
|Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers||Yes|
|Ozone Secretariat||No||High-income countries (designated as Article 5 countries) and lower-income countries have common but differentiated responsibilities (http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php).|
|ICPR nations (1976-1986)||Yes||The costs of participating in the ICPR were relatively low; countries did not engage in pollution abatement costs of pollution as part of the ICPR governance system (although they expectedly did it as part of their own and European national regulations.|
|ICPR nations (1986-2000)||Yes||The proportionality of costs and benefits was better taken care than in the past (see "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"|
|Rhine chemical firms||Yes||The industry enjoyed good economic juncture; also there were prospects to export the new developed technologies to other countries.|
|Rhine agricultural sector||No||There is no apparent benefit for farmers to abate pollution; rather costs|
|GBR government co-managers||Not Applicable|
|GBR recreational fishers||Yes||There is low or no cost to being a recreational fisher. All that is required to be one is gear (fishing rod etc), maybe a boat. There is a fee to become a member of a recreational fishing association (e.g., Australian National Sportfishing Association), but membership is not required to fish recreationally. No recreational fishing license is needed.|
|GBR fisheries managers||Not Applicable|
|GBR commercial fishers||No||Commercial fisheries feel highly regulated and invest a lot in monitoring. They feel that the governance system does not value the fishing industry as much as it does other industries like tourism. Therefore, commercial fishing is managed more closely than other sectors. Fish catches overall have declined since establishment of the GBRMP.|
|National Marine Sanctuaries Office of NOAA||Not Applicable|
|Australian Toothfish Fishers||Yes|
|Wakatobi Bajau fishers||No||Receive more benefits than costs - fishing is central to their culture and society. There are limited no take areas in WNP and the Bajau are high mobile. Bajau also prefer not to be involved as much in meetings/monitoring and official government activities.|
|NWHI Monument Co-Trusteeship||Not Applicable|
|Wakatobi managers||Not Applicable|
|Australian Antarctic Division||Not Applicable|
|GMR managers||Not Applicable|
|Riparian Nations (1976-1986)|
|Charles Darwin Foundation||Not Applicable|
|Galapagos Tourism Sector||Yes||Galapagos is seen as an ecotourism destination. Tourism accounts for 78% of all employment in the Galapagos, quite profitable.|
|Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers||No||Receive more benefits than costs - fishing is central to their culture and society.|
|NWHI Researchers||Not Applicable|
|California Academic Researchers||Yes||Most research is not being funded by individual group members but by grants for the directed research. While many research objectives are to improve the ecosystem health of the sanctuaries, some do not result in any direct application. Overall most research is used to benefit one or more aspects of the Sanctuary and benefit the researcher's career.|
|California Sanctuary Recreational Users||Yes||Tourism is a highly lucrative industry in this area, and much of it is due to recreation within the Sanctuary. Most whale watching boats were old fishermen boats converted for tourism, and have made much more profit in the tourism industry than they did fishing. Kayaking and paddle boarding is generally low cost. Scuba diving is a popular activity with many benefits, and shore diving is a lower cost but common strategy. An estimated 4,500 to 5,000 passengers go on Farallon Islands trips annually. Average adult ticket prices around San Francisco are $60 for a half‐day trip while full‐day trips to the Farallon Islands can cost between $95 and $125. Shorter harbour trips of around 2 hours are also run and cost $30 but only offer opportunistic sightings of dolphins and porpoises. Average adult ticket prices in the Monterey Bay sanctuary for 2 to 3 hour trips are $46. Average adult ticket prices for longer trips are $86 (O'Connor et al. 2009). Travel and tourism totaled $5.9 billion in travel-spending revenue in 2003 for the five counties adjacent to the Monterey Bay National Marine sanctuary. Much of this tourism is focused on the coast and ocean protected by the sanctuary (NMS, 2014).|
|California Groundfish Fishermen||No||For many species, the quota allocations have decreased substantially, making the high costs of owning and maintaining a boat and a limited entry license high cost, with not as much benefit as once occurred. Additionally, the high cost of paying for an on-board monitor is many times higher than the benefit they receive from their catch.|
|California State and Federal Fisheries Agencies||Not Applicable|
|Raja Ampat Tourism||Yes||Receive more benefits than costs - profitably industry.|
|Australian Fisheries Management Authority||Not Applicable|
|Raja Ampat Managers||Not Applicable|
|Macquarie Island Managers||Not Applicable|
|Svalbard Resource Managers||As a group of government organizations, this group does not function as a profit driven business. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 states that any tax levied in Svalbard must be spent Svalbard, and that taxes/fees should not exceed the costs of administration. Since 2007, there has been an Environmental Protection Fund which provides money for environmental projects. Each tourist visiting Svalbard pays a fee (NOK 150, about $20US) to the environmental protection fund (Report No.22 2008-2009 ).|
|Svalbard Tourism||Yes||As a growing industry, the number of tourists visiting Svalbard increased throughout the time period coded (2004-2012) (Sysselmannen på Svalbard 2012 ). As the second largest industry in Svalbard, in 2007 tourism directly employed 211 people and contributed NOK 317 million (about $41 million US) to the economy (Report No.22 2008-2009).|
|CORALINA||No||CORALINA receives money (is paid) to manage human activities|
|Seaflower artisanal fishers||No||It seems that artisanal fishers put a lot of their time and effort in the MPA creation management process but it does not seem their economic situation improved nor that MPA is functioning properly.|
|Svalbard Shrimp Fishers||The overall value of the Norwegian shrimp fishery (not just Svalbard area) is about 500 million NOK per year ($65 million US) (Statistics Norway [Online ]). Fishing statistics for indicate that for groundfishing as a whole (including shrimp) that revenues have exceeded costs, making it profitable (Fiskeridirektoratet 2015 ).|
|Galapagos Charles Darwin Foundation||Not Applicable|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Director of National Parks||Not Applicable|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers||Yes||Yes - if group members (commercial fishers) incur greater costs (e.g. more licenses, better boats and technology) they have access to catch more fish and incur greater benefits. Even though the production volume for the wild-catch sector decreased by 4% the gross value of Australian commercial fisheries production increased by 3% and the gross value of aquaculture production increased from $100 million to $1.1 billion (which includes southern bluefin tuna wild-catch input to the South Australian tuna farming sector) (Australian fisheries statistics 2012).|
|Cenderwasih managers||Not Applicable|
|Falkland Islands Government (FIG) Fisheries Managers||No||No/little costs for managers, but many professional benefits. Small team, often early career scientists and managers who leave after 2, 3, 4 years to continue career paths.|
|Patagonian Squid Trawlers||Yes||Costs include taxes, licenses, fuel, vessel maintenance. Profits exceed costs. Often countries (e.g. Spain) subsidize costs, helping this. Very expensive to be involved in fishery, but high economic outputs.|
|New Zealand Fishery Managers||No||Benefits in experience and pay, little costs.|
|New Zealand Arrow Squid Fishers||Yes||Costs are very high so always try to minimize, but make profits. Profits not guaranteed. Trawlers and quotas are very expensive, but high value fishery.|
|California market squid fishermen||Yes||Make profit most of the time, but not always. Depends on availability. High costs for licenses, dockage, and vessel maintenance. But highest value fishery they catch.|
|California Department of Fish and Wildlife Market Squid Managers||No||More benefits (pay and career) than costs.|
|Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio)|
|Brazilian Institute of the Environment & Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA)||Not Applicable|
|Secretary of State for the Environment of Pará (SEMA) in Brazil||Not Applicable|
|Association of Users in the Caete-Teperacu RESEX (ASSUREMACATA) in Brazil||Missing|
|Lombok aquaculture farmers||Missing|
|Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI|
|SCUBA diving businesses on Gili Trawangan|
|Gili Indah Dive Association (GIDA)||Yes|
|Gili EcoTrust on Gili Trawangan||Not Applicable|
|Palito-Montero AMPR Costa Rica|
|Isla Caballo AMPR Costa Rica||Missing|
|Paquera-Tambor AMPR Costa Rica||Missing|
|Misool Eco Resort|
Basic:A basic variable describes essential and basic background information for a component.
Biophysical:Biophysical variables describe just that: important biophysical properties, largely of environmental commons, that are not captured by a more specific theme.
Causation:A variable with this theme describes issues of causality, which is a complex subject. Most basically this theme is associated with variables that describe different types of causation and different types of causes of environmental problems.
Context:contextual variable relates the component with which it associated to the social and/or ecological setting of a particular interaction and/or case.
Ecosystem services:Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or describe the provision of important ecosystem services by a natural resource.
Enforcement:Enforcement involves several different processes, including monitoring for violations of rules, sanctioning violators, and conflict resolution mechanisms involved in this process. Variables that relate to any of these processes should be attached to this theme.
External:Variables with this theme relate a component to processes external to the case with which the component is associated.
Heterogeneity:Variables with this theme describe important ways in which the member of an actor group differ from each other.
Incentives: This theme is associated with variables that are not directly related to institutions and rules, but which still play a role in affecting the incentives that commons users have to ameliorate or exacerbate the commons they use.
Institutional-biophysical linkage:This is a sub-theme of the institutions theme, and describes those variables that ask about the relationship between a set of institutions and a biophysical aspect of a commons.
Institutions:Variables with this theme describe the social institutions (rules, property rights) that are used to organize and direct human behavior. It does not include monitoring and enforcement of these institutions, as these are associated with the Enforcement theme.
Knowledge and uncertainty:Variables with this theme describe levels of knowledge that actor groups have regarding a commons, as well as factors that affect how much uncertainty there is in the status and dynamics of that commons.
Leadership:Leaders play an important role in commons management, most traditionally by providing for public goods needed to organize commons users. But there are other possible roles, and variables associated with this theme can relate to any role that a leader might play in an interaction.
Outcomes:This theme is attached to variables that deal with any outcomes that are produced by the actions of relevant actors in an interaction.
Resource renewability:Variables associated with this theme deal with the ability of a natural resource to be highly productive and renewable.
Social capital:Social capital captures the processes that enable the members of an actor group to work effectively together. Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or in some way express the level of social capital among members of a group.
Spatial:Variables associated with the Spatial theme describe important spatial patterns or dynamics, such as the spatial heterogeneity of a commons, or whether or not a user group resides within a particular commons.
Technology:This theme is attached to variables that consider the role that technology and infrastructure have in affecting commons outcomes.