| Variable Type | Ordinal |
|---|---|
| Variable Component Type | Actor |
| Variable Kind | Component |
| Theme | Leadership (learn about themes) |
| Projects | SESMAD, Fiji fisheries |
| Question | How accountable are the leaders to the other members of the group? |
| Select Options | 1 Low, 2 Medium, 3 High |
| Unit | |
| Role | |
| Importance | This variable is important because affects whether or not leaders act on behalf of the group’s interest. This is crucial, as leadership authority, expertise and sense of opportunity might all work towards improved resource management or the opposite depending on the intent of the group leader/s (Theesfeld 2009). |
| Definition | "Leadership accountability ascertains whether there are de facto mechanisms that enable the actors in a group to make the group leader/s liable for their decisions vis a vis resource governance. There are formal and informal mechanisms through which leaders can be held accountable, including from voting, reporting and financial auditing, to public hearings and other forms of personal communication (Madrigal, Alpizar, and Schluter 2010). Accountability can happen vertically, between a leader and other members of the group, and horizontally between leaders of the same group (Fox 1992). High: occurs when mechanisms of accountability are very effective and actors the leader represents are able to invoke/use them (e.g., when an elected official is not re-elected/or impeached because actors do not agree with his/her leadership or actions) Low: actors are not able to use accountability mechanisms, or no or very few accountability mechanisms exists" |
| Sectors |
Theory Usages
| Theory | Value Used |
|---|---|
| Centralization and corruption | Low |
| Accountable leadership | High |
| Conditions for general resilience | Moderate or High |
Associated Studies
| Study Citation |
|---|
Component Usages
| Component | Value Used | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Galapagos Artisan Fishermen | High (3) | Leaders (Presidents) are elected by the members of the fishing cooperative. Presidents are subject to the scrutiny of the unionized members of their cooperatives, and may be changed or deprived of their positions if internal conflicts arise. |
| "New Order" Indonesian Central Government (1965-1998) | Low (1) | Suharto was a dictator with little accountability to others working in the government, or to citizens. |
| Indonesian "Adat" Communities | missing in case | |
| Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia | not applicable (no leader) | |
| Indonesian District Governments | Does this refer to inter or intra group? Individual district leaders have medium levels of accountability to their district, but no accountability to other districts. | |
| "Reformasi" Indonesian Central Government (1998-2012) | Medium (2) | The president is accountable to the general public (through elections and through the legislative and judicial branches), and the other sections of government make up a part of that group, however they are not the primary people to whom the president is accountable. Furthermore, there have been suggestions that even after the instigation of democracy, the government remains highly oligarchical (Fukuoka 2013) and that the main change has been a decentralization of patronage networks (previously centralized under Suharto) and a redistribution of riches to elites previously excluded from Suharto's group of allies (Fukukoka 2013b). |
| Indonesian Local entrepreneurs | Not applicable. | |
| Civil society organizations in Indonesia | Low (1) | During the Suharto regime, civil society organizations were limited and controlled by the government (Antlove et al. 2005); thus, they had very limited accountability, to Suharto and his allies. Moreover, most of the organizations were NGOs supported by donors which, as stated by advocacy-oriented activists in a motion of no-confidence motion in a 1995 meeting, "had merely become the extended arm and implementing agencies of the authoritarian government and had lost its commitment towards change." (Antlove et al. 2005) They were criticized for hierarchy, bureaucracy, co-optation and lack of internal accountability (ibid). After the fall of Suharto, there has been a significant growth in civil society and its organizations. Antlove et al note that the effects of the Suharto period are felt today in the form of elitism and little effective grassroots participation among NGOs, but that there is an increasing call for accountability from citizens to these organizations. "Right at the moment when there is a lack of confidence among civil actors about what they are actually able to achieve and how to achieve it, both the internal governance of CSOs [civil society organizations] as well as their external performance in the public domain are becoming subject of greater scrutiny....The general public, the media as well as state actors, are increasingly complaining about the lack of accountability of NGOs and other civil society organizations....There have been newspaper articles about the “Billion rupiah business of NGO” (Bisnin Milyaran LSM) and allegations of corruption and misuse. " At the same time, the authors point out that beginning in the 2000s there have been a number of initiatives to improve CSO governance (e.g. transparency and accountability), which are beginning to solidify. This includes a 2001 law (Law 16/2001) which was a breakthrough for good governance of the non-profit sector in Indonesia, " as it provided assurance and legal certainty, as well as restored the yayasan’s [foundations'] function as a non-profit institution with social, religious and humanitarian goals." So we could say accountability is low but increasing. |
| ICCAT Contracting Parties | ||
| ICCAT Western Members | ||
| ICCAT Eastern Members | N/A | |
| Ozone Nation States | Not applicable | |
| Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers | Low (1) | Not applicable. |
| Ozone Secretariat | Low (1) | |
| ICPR nations (1976-1986) | Medium (2) | Leadership is informal and thus there are not institutional mechanisms to make The Netherlands accountable; however, there are mechanisms of transparency and judicial procedures hosted by the European Union. |
| ICPR nations (1986-2000) | Low (1) | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
| Rhine chemical firms | ||
| Rhine agricultural sector | ||
| GBR government co-managers | Low (1) | The leaders of these organisations are accountable to Federal and State governments respectively rather than to employees (members of the group). |
| GBR recreational fishers | Medium (2) | Leaders are voted in and out by the associations' members. Most recreational fishers are not part of these associations though they could elect to become members. |
| Wetfish Fishermen | ||
| GBR fisheries managers | Low (1) | Accountable to State government not employees |
| GBR commercial fishers | Medium (2) | The staff of the QSIA are somewhat accountable to the commercial fishing sectors, although they cannot be formally voted in or out by the sector. And only some fishers are members of the association. |
| National Marine Sanctuaries Office of NOAA | Medium (2) | Leaders are expected to follow guidelines set by national standards and to their employees, however a lack of appropriate leadership may take some time to be recognized and a substitute provided for. |
| Australian Toothfish Fishers | Missing | |
| Wakatobi Bajau fishers | High (3) | Village heads are elected every 3-5 years, standardised procedure. |
| NWHI Monument Co-Trusteeship | High (3) | |
| Wakatobi managers | Not Applicable | |
| Australian Antarctic Division | Medium (2) | |
| GMR managers | High (3) | |
| Riparian Nations (1976-1986) | ||
| Charles Darwin Foundation | High (3) | CDF is managed by an executive director who is appointed by a board. |
| Galapagos Tourism Sector | High (3) | Assume governement agency accountable |
| Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | High (3) | The village leader is elected by the other community members to oversee all sasi practices, therefore their decisions directly affect everyone in the group and make them accountable (Mcleod, 2009) |
| NWHI Researchers | Not Applicable | |
| California Academic Researchers | Low (1) | Principal investigators are accountable to their own institutions, projects, and funders but typically not to other members of the group. |
| California Sanctuary Recreational Users | Low (1) | Informal leaders must abide by laws and make way for other users (e.g. kayakers have to watch out for whale watching boats) and any violation of law can be enforced by the correct authorities. Higher accountability for recreational fishers and avoidance of overexploitation of target species. |
| California Groundfish Fishermen | Low (1) | Leaders typically speak on behalf of the other fishermen, but are not expected to represent all fishermen. |
| California State and Federal Fisheries Agencies | High (3) | The chair and vice-chair positions are voted on by the voting members of the Council. Any such chair that is deemed to not be managing appropriately can be out-voted by council members. |
| Community C | High (3) | 4.32/5: This indicates that on average levels of trust in leaders falls between Trust More Than Distrust (4) and Trust Entirely (5) |
| Community D | High (3) | 4.64/5: This value indicates that on average levels of trust in leaders falls between trust more than distrust (4) and entirely trust (5) |
| Community A | High (3) | 4.12/5. This measure indicates that average levels of trust in leaders falls somewhere between trust more than distrust and entirely trust. This measure assumes that levels of trust correspond to accountability. |
| Community B | Medium (2) | 3/5. On average community members neither trust nor distrust local leaders. This measure assumes that levels of trust correspond to levels of accountability. |
| Raja Ampat Tourism | High (3) | Tourism department of Raja Ampat government |
| Australian Fisheries Management Authority | Medium (2) | AFMA, as a government agency, has a bureaucratic structure. |
| Raja Ampat Managers | High (3) | Formally appointed. |
| Macquarie Island Managers | Low (1) | Leaders of each group are not formally accountable to one another. |
| Svalbard Resource Managers | High (3) | All members are working towards the same/similar goals. |
| Svalbard Tourism | High (3) | At each annual general meeting, there are elections held for the positions on each committee of AECO. Since AECO members pay an annual fee, (likely which helps to pay for salaried positions) we would expect the Executive Director to have high accountability to the member organizations. |
| CORALINA | Not Applicable | |
| Seaflower artisanal fishers | Missing | NO DATA |
| Community G | Medium (2) | 3.67/5: This value indicates that levels of trust in other members of the community falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust(4). |
| Community E | Medium (2) | 3.88/5: This indicates that on average respondents level of trust in leaders falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4). |
| Community F | Medium (2) | 3.36/5: Average level of trust in leaders from members of the community indicates that it falls somewhere between neither trusting nor distrusting (3) and Trust more than distrust (4). |
| Community H | Medium (2) | 3.61/5. This value indicates that on average levels of trust in leaders falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4). |
| Svalbard Shrimp Fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Galapagos Charles Darwin Foundation | High (3) | CDF is managed by an executive director who is appointed by a board. |
| GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Director of National Parks | Low (1) | The Director of National Parks is accountable to Federal and State governments respectively rather than to employees (members of the group). |
| GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | Medium (2) | CFA staff and board have to report the outcomes of the modus operandi to the membership that includes: quarterly reports, an annual review, annual financial accounts and an annual report. Although, only some fishers are members of the Association. |
| Cenderwasih fishers | High (3) | Leaders are elected, and the communitites will speak out if their leaders misbehave (socio-economic basline survey 2008) |
| Cenderwasih managers | ||
| Falkland Islands Government (FIG) Fisheries Managers | Medium (2) | While there are formal processes to hold managers accountable, such as the Internal Review Process, such processes are not especially strong. Managers find themselves accountable and hold themselves to professional standards. But yes held to their actions, though fisheries it is difficult to ascertain fault. |
| Patagonian Squid Trawlers | High (3) | Leaders rotate, and those that cause trouble are dealt with by the group. |
| New Zealand Fishery Managers | Medium (2) | Professionally held accountable, but not to the law. |
| New Zealand Arrow Squid Fishers | High (3) | High social pressure. |
| California market squid fishermen | Medium (2) | No formal way to hold accountability, but socially important. |
| California Department of Fish and Wildlife Market Squid Managers | Low (1) | While leaders could be held accountable, this is rare. Professionally held accountable. |
| Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) | Missing | |
| Brazilian Institute of the Environment & Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) | Missing | |
| Secretary of State for the Environment of Pará (SEMA) in Brazil | Missing | |
| Association of Users in the Caete-Teperacu RESEX (ASSUREMACATA) in Brazil | Low (1) | |
| Lombok aquaculture farmers | Low (1) | |
| Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI | Not Applicable | |
| SCUBA diving businesses on Gili Trawangan | Medium (2) | |
| Gili Indah Dive Association (GIDA) | High (3) | |
| Gili EcoTrust on Gili Trawangan | High (3) | |
| Palito-Montero AMPR Costa Rica | Low (1) | |
| Isla Caballo AMPR Costa Rica | Low (1) | |
| Paquera-Tambor AMPR Costa Rica | High (3) | |
| Misool Eco Resort |