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Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database: Case

SummaryIndonesia is a large island archipelago in South East Asia. Prior to the 1950s, most of the islands were covered in dense forests, where primarily indigenous inhabitants lived forest-dependent lifestyles following customary laws ("adat"), although they also had engaged in agriculture and trade for many centuries (Peluso, 1992; Peluso & Vandergeest, 2001). Much of the region was colonized by the Dutch, whose activities focused on a small number of relatively densely populated islands (e.g. Java). Indonesia became an independent country in 1949, and feel into an increasingly authoritarian rule under Sukarno. Between 1965 and 1968, general Suharto, the head of the military, wrested power from Sukarno. In order to consolidate his power and alleviate social unrest, Suharto's "New Order" regime followed a number of policies that dramatically changed the relationships between forest and people, particularly on the outer islands, and resulted in dramatic declines in forest cover. In particular, he provided incentives for people from Java to settle in the outlying islands, granted logging and mining concessions to military and political allies, and legally dispossessed the indigenous inhabitants of the outlying islands. Indonesia emerged as a major exporter of forest products, first of roundwood, and later, in the 1980s, of plywood and other processed products. Because data about forests prior to Suharto's regime is limited, we begin our coding in 1965. Suharto's regime collapsed in 1998 under the pressure of an economic crisis and social mobilizations, and thus the first snapshot we code in this case runs from 1965 to 1998, a period of relatively stability in forest policies, and of dramatic declines in forest cover. Perhaps the most dramatic changes in forest cover occurred as a result of the interaction of logging with large-scale forest fires induced by a severe drought (related to El Nino) in 1997 (Dauvergne 1998). In 1998 a new democratic constitution was created; competitive legislative elections began in 1999 and presidential elections began in 2004. The period from 1998-2012 saw a rapid decentralization of authority over forests to local governments, followed by a gradual and partial recentralization, as well as the growth of domestic civil society and international pressure to limit and control logging, particularly illegal logging. At the same time, rates of forest clearance for alternative activities (most notably oil palm plantations) have increased dramatically. Actual impacts on forest conditions of these changes are difficult to assess, as there are conflicting reports of forest cover change in this period. It appears that forest clearing dropped very significantly in 1998, lasting for several years - it is not clear if this is the result of governance changes or of the severe economic downturn in 1998. Clearing increased significantly after about 2005, and according to some sources, deforestation rates had returned to pre-1998 levels by about 2010. Starting in 2009, Indonesia began to be increasingly involved in global forest governance arrangements, including a ban on new forest concessions supported by a grant from the Norwegian government. The effects of these changes is not yet clear, and we end our coding in 2012 because at the time the case was finally entered in the database (May 2014), it was not clear what impacts these changes were having in the last couple of years. The coding of this case was the basis of a paper written by the coding team, to be published (2014) as pat of a Special Issue of SESMAD cases in the International Journal of the Commons.
Statuspublic
TeamIndonesian Forests Coding Team
Start Date2014-05-13 14:43:44 -0400
Coding Complete?No
SectorForests
ProjectSESMAD
Data Source(s)Secondary data
CountryIndonesia
External BiophysicalEl Nino brings dry weather to Indonesia, and in 1997 this contributed to severe fires throughout the forests of the region, leading to significant forest degradation. The severity of fires was not merely caused by the dry weather, but by its interaction with past forest management - see Dauvergne (1998).
External SocialIndonesian forests are heavily impacted by international markets for timber, minerals, and palm oil. Increases in prices for timber, palm oil, or minerals leads to increased pressure to clear forests for timber, creating new mines or plantations. Colchester et al. (2006) for instance note: "World markets for edible oils are set to double in the next twenty years, implying a doubling of the area under oil palm if market share [of Indonesia] is maintained. New markets for ‘biofuels’ also provide scope for increased palm oil sales." Forests are also impacted by international legal and political dynamics. For instance, in the 1960s the US support to the Suharto dictatorship facilitated the establishment of this regime and its development policies, indirectly influencing the forest governance system. In a more recent period, international pressures to decrease illegal logging and deforestation have also had an impact, though the exact significance still remains to be seen. Legality verification programs in the US ("Lacey Act") and the EU have made it more difficult for many Indonesian forest products companies to sell directly to these important markets. Forest certification (through the FSC) has also had an impact locally. Both the legality verification programs and FSC certification are discussed by Dauvergne and Lister (2011), Cashore and Stone (2012), and Bartley (2010). More recently, Indonesia has been an important stage for the development of a proposed regime for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), notably in the form of a moratorium on new forest concessions beginning in 2011, and funded by the Norwegian government (see Murdiyarso et al., 2011, Austin et al., 2012, Edwards et al, 2012, Sloan et al. 2012). Social and political unrest in the country as a whole, particularly in the transition to democracy in 1998, has also had an influence on forest management. The 1998 economic crisis, which was a major cause of the fall of the Suharto regime, was triggered at least in part by international economic cycles.
SnapshotsWe do not code the period prior to 1965 due to lack of information. The first snapshot lasts from 1965 (The year Suharto began taking control from Sukarno and instituting the "New Order Regime") to 1998, when Suharto's government collapsed. The second snapshot lasts from 1998, when Suharto fell and a new democratic regime began, to 2012, which at the time of final coding (May 2014) was the most recent year for which we had available data.
TimelineSnapshot 1: Suharto's “New Order” regime 1965 - 1997 1965 Sukarno sidelined by Suharto & placed under house arrest 1967 Basic Forestry law asserts central govt. control over all forests. Logging permits granted by local govt. to small-scale enterprises. 1970-71 Central government revokes local logging permits. Large-scale concessions begin to be granted to political allies of regime. Early 1980s • Transmigration program: Javanese moved to outlying islands. • Erosion of customary (“adat”) law • Ban on log exports forces concession holders to invest in plywood and pulp processing, which are subsidized Late 1980’s Development of Industrial Timber Plantations Mid 1990s • “forestry crisis” – high levels of deforestation, overcapacity in wood processing sector, decline in timber concessions • Rise of coal mining & palm oil industries 1997 Asian monetary crisis hits Indonesia 1997-8 Massive forest fires due to El Nino droughts & extensive logging. Snapshot 2: Early democratic era 1998 - present 1998 • Fall of Suharto’s government, democratic elections • Villagers demand local control over resources • Log export ban removed 1999 Laws grant greater autonomy and revenue control to districts, districts permitted to grant small forest concessions. New forestry law passes, reaffirming central government control over forests. 2000 Constitution amended to recognize customary (adat) law, used by indigenous groups 2002 District government authority to grant concessions suspended 2004 New laws reverse trend towards regional autonomy 2006 National Land Reform Program begins 2009 President commits to reducing CO2 emissions by 26% by 2020 2010 Norway and Indonesia sign REDD+ partnership aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 2011 and 2013 2 year ban implemented (2011) and extended (2013) on new logging & forest conversion concessions 2013 Indonesia’s Constitutional Court invalidates the Indonesian government’s claim to millions of hectares of forest land
Modeling IssuesIs it right to model the agriculture and mining industries as one actor group? They are very different, but in many ways their relationship to forests is similar. Breaking up the forest governance system into subunits and actors is quite confusing. We chose to model this as a single governance system, with actors being the national government and district governments, but provincial governments (intermediate between district and national) are also players, albeit less important, and differences between districts are sufficiently large that it is conceivable that each of Indonesia's hundreds of districts could be considered a separate governance system. Similarly, relationships between national forest authorities and district and local governments are complex and confusing, so it isn't always clear that these are separate entities. Finally, there are relationships within the national government (e.g. between the forest department and the military in the first snapshot, and between the forest department and the elected branches of government in the second) that are not particularly well captured by this model.
Surveys
TheoriesBorlaug hypothesis and deforestation

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Attached Components

Actors

Name:
Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia
details
Past collaboration:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group?
Costs of exit:
Yes
Extractive industries are highly profitable in Indonesia, thus leaving this group involves forgoing large potential profits. On the other hand, those profiting from extractive industries may be able to move their capital into other activities that are also profitable, lowering the costs of leaving the group.
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
No
? Not sure how to code this
Interest heterogeneity:
Medium (2)
Coal mining companies, logging companies, and plantation industries (pulp, oil palm) all have very different structures, and may even have different views of the forest (i.e. logging companies may prefer land to remain as forest as opposed to be converted to other uses in the long run), however they all have a common interest in maintaining access to forest land for commercial extraction.
Leadership:
No leader
Some sub parts of this group had leadership at some point (i.e. Bob Hasan and the Apkindo group of timber companies - see Barr 1998). However this has been the exception to the rule - there is no broader coordination of extractive industries, and even Hasan's leadership of the timber companies was relatively short lived (basically from the late 1980s-1998).
Leadership authority:
 
not applicable (no leader)
Actor group trust:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group?
Personal communication:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group?
Remote communication:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group?
Leadership accountability:
 
not applicable (no leader)
Actor group coordination:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group?
Name:
Civil society organizations in Indonesia
details
Past collaboration:
Medium (2)
Lack of coordination between NGOs from different sectors has been noted as one of the weaknesses of these organizations, characterized as sectoral and fragmented (Antlove et al. 2005) At the same time, there are some incipient collaboration efforts between NGOs formalized in organizations at regional and national levels. At the national level there is YAPPIKA, a national NGO alliance for civil society and democracy. YAPPIKA "implemented a program starting in 2000 to assess the health of Indonesian civil society using the CIVICUS Index on Civil Society. The objectives of the assessment included increasing the knowledge and understanding of the status of civil society in Indonesia, empowering civil society stakeholders through dialog and networking, and providing civil society with tools to analyze sector-wide strengths and weaknesses, as well as to develop strategies to foster positive social change." (Antlove et al. 2005). Among other things, they have held participatory dialogues with more than 400 civil society organizations. At the regional level, there are examples such as the Consortium for the Development of Civil Society (KPMM), created in 2000 in West Sumatra by twelve NGOs to try to address the lack of accountability among civil society organizations in the province. To do so, KPMM developed a code of ethics and standard operational procedures for its membership organizations. However, as of 2005, three of the initial twelve NGOs had left the organization because they felt that the code of ethics was too strict. So, overall, we could say past collaboration was initially low but has been growing over the years.
Costs of exit:
 
Missing in case
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
 
Missing in case
Interest heterogeneity:
 
? See Peluso 2008 article
Leadership:
 
?
Leadership authority:
 
?
Actor group trust:
 
?
Personal communication:
 
?
Remote communication:
 
?
Leadership accountability:
Low (1)
During the Suharto regime, civil society organizations were limited and controlled by the government (Antlove et al. 2005); thus, they had very limited accountability, to Suharto and his allies. Moreover, most of the organizations were NGOs supported by donors which, as stated by advocacy-oriented activists in a motion of no-confidence motion in a 1995 meeting, "had merely become the extended arm and implementing agencies of the authoritarian government and had lost its commitment towards change." (Antlove et al. 2005) They were criticized for hierarchy, bureaucracy, co-optation and lack of internal accountability (ibid). After the fall of Suharto, there has been a significant growth in civil society and its organizations. Antlove et al note that the effects of the Suharto period are felt today in the form of elitism and little effective grassroots participation among NGOs, but that there is an increasing call for accountability from citizens to these organizations. "Right at the moment when there is a lack of confidence among civil actors about what they are actually able to achieve and how to achieve it, both the internal governance of CSOs [civil society organizations] as well as their external performance in the public domain are becoming subject of greater scrutiny....The general public, the media as well as state actors, are increasingly complaining about the lack of accountability of NGOs and other civil society organizations....There have been newspaper articles about the “Billion rupiah business of NGO” (Bisnin Milyaran LSM) and allegations of corruption and misuse. " At the same time, the authors point out that beginning in the 2000s there have been a number of initiatives to improve CSO governance (e.g. transparency and accountability), which are beginning to solidify. This includes a 2001 law (Law 16/2001) which was a breakthrough for good governance of the non-profit sector in Indonesia, " as it provided assurance and legal certainty, as well as restored the yayasan’s [foundations'] function as a non-profit institution with social, religious and humanitarian goals." So we could say accountability is low but increasing.
Actor group coordination:
Both formal and informal
Coordination within civil society organizations is structured by written internal rules. Coordination between different civil society organizations is done formally and informally, as with YAPPIKA at the national level.
Name:
"New Order" Indonesian Central Government (1965-1998)
details
Past collaboration:
High (3)
The members of the government of Indonesia worked very closely together during this period, although to be fair, it was probably largely due to central coordination as opposed to trust between members.
Costs of exit:
Yes
Individuals who left the government lost access to privilege and patronage, and sometimes their freedom, or even their lives. While great wealth could be amassed by Suharto's allies, those outside of this system had limited opportunities and were subjected to political persecution.
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
No
While certain members of the government (particularly family members and military and business leaders with close ties to Suharto) received most of the benefits of the system, in the form of privileged access to forest concessions - they incurred few costs. Costs were largely borne by those dependent on forests for their subsistence, or by the natural systems themselves.
Interest heterogeneity:
Medium (2)
Although the members of the central government all had an interest in maintaining central control over forest resources, it appears that there was some differences between concession holders (often powerful members of the military) and the forest department over how forests should be managed.
Leadership:
Formal leader
Suharto was a strong formal leader of the government.
Leadership authority:
High (3)
Suharto was a dictator with a great deal of authority over others working in the government, and over the nation as a whole.
Actor group trust:
High (3)
The regime operated through a small and very tight-knight group of allies which Suharto trusted; this trust was based on family ties, on proving useful to Suharto, not having a political agenda that would challenge Suharto in any way, and of course not criticizing the regime. As a Machiavellian, Suharto had a good instinct for whom to trust. For instance, BJ Habibie, one of Suharto's closest allies, won his trust showing persistent obeisance (strong deferential respect), and having usefulness in technological knowledge and in mobilizing the community of Muslim 'modernist' intellectuals, though there was also a personal friendship to Suharto dating back to much before the New Order (Amir, 2007); meanwhile, Azwar Anas won Suharto's trust due to his ability to integrate West Sumatra into Indonesia's unitary state, and later secured his position by allying with Habibie (Prasetyawan, 2006). The importance of trust between Suharto and his close allies could also be seen in the recent interpretation of his regime's fall as a result of increasing tensions (i.e. the breakdown of trust and reciprocity) between Suharto and previously loyal oligarchs (see Fukukoka, 2013).
Personal communication:
More than once a year (5)
Although not all members of this group communicated on a frequent basis with each other, some subgroups communicated with each other very frequently (on a daily basis).
Remote communication:
More than once a year (5)
Although not all members of this group communicated on a frequent basis with each other, some subgroups communicated with each other very frequently (on a daily basis). Although we have no direct evidence of this, given the period, we assume that much of this communication took place by telephone, remotely.
Leadership accountability:
Low (1)
Suharto was a dictator with little accountability to others working in the government, or to citizens.
Actor group coordination:
Both formal and informal
The government was a centralized hierarchy that had a high level of formal coordination. At the same time, informal kinship and clientelist connections between key actors (particularly among Suharto's military allies) played a key role in the forest governance system, enabling many 'friends' of the regime to gain forest concessions and to bend or escape legal consequences for formally illegal activities.
Name:
Indonesian District Governments
details
Past collaboration:
Low (1)
Although it is not clear if this refers to Inter or intra group, it doesn't matter, because past levels of collaboration were low, as prior to 1998, district governments were almost entirely unempowered.
Costs of exit:
 
It is not clear how to apply the question to this kind of case. I'm not sure what it means for the members of this group to leave? Is it possible for a district government to leave? maybe this needs to be not applicable?
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
 
missing in case
Interest heterogeneity:
 
Missing in case. We have little evidence of interest divergence or convergence about district governments. It is also unclear if this question refers to the divergence of interests of individual actors within the same district government, or whether this refers to the divergence of interests between different district governments (which, although we have no evidence, we suppose to be fairly high given the overall levels of heterogeneity between different regions of Indonesia).
Leadership:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group? Individual district governments have formal leaders, but there is no leader representing all district governments.
Leadership authority:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group? Individual district leaders have medium levels of authority within their districts. They have no between district authority.
Actor group trust:
 
missing in case
Personal communication:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group. Within districts, individuals communicate very frequently (far more than once per year) but between districts, they do not communicate.
Remote communication:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group. Within districts, individuals communicate very frequently (far more than once per year), and some of this communication happens remotely, but between districts, they do not communicate.
Leadership accountability:
 
Does this refer to inter or intra group? Individual district leaders have medium levels of accountability to their district, but no accountability to other districts.
Actor group coordination:
 
inter or intra? Individual district governments engage in both formal and informal coordination, but there appears to be little if any coordination between district governments
Name:
"Reformasi" Indonesian Central Government (1998-2012)
details
Past collaboration:
Medium (2)
Different agencies of the central government have worked closely with each other in the past, and employees have worked closely between them within particular agencies. However, reviews of Indonesian forest governance have noted that agencies have shown "little effective coordination" in actions against illegal logging (Barr, 2001) and overall in the implementation of forest management and land allocation policies (Brockhaus et al. 2012). There have also been recurring conflicts between the central and the district authorities in the implementation of forest laws, including the concession system (e.g. McCarthy 2004, McLeod, 2005) and participatory forestry schemes (e.g. Nomura, . As described by McLeod (2005): "With Soeharto's demise, Indonesia gained democracy but lost effective government....This franchise (the Suharto government) has disintegrated, its various component parts now working at cross-purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing fashion."
Costs of exit:
No
This is an error, and should be recoded as "missing in case". It may be that the cost of leaving government employment is not very high, but we really don't have any clear evidence on this point.
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
 
Missing in case
Interest heterogeneity:
High (3)
The new government has been characterized by conflicts about the use of forest resources between different interests in different agencies (e.g. Forest vs. Agriculture), between different levels (central, provincial, and district governments) and between old and new elites within the government. For instance, after a few years of the new Reformasi government, McCarthy (2004) characterized the legal and political structure of the new decentralized governance system as a set of "volatile socio-legal configurations" with multiple contradictory interests concerning resource management. Brockhaus et al. (2012) also conclude in their analysis of forest and land allocation policies that there is a "lack of institutional clarity" and lack of coordination between agencies with different, conflicting objectives and mandates regarding resource management. An internationally-famous example is the conflicting proposals that since the 1990s until 2008 were debated in a region of East Kalimantan: on one hand, a national park i -part of the famous "Heart of Borneo" conservation initiative- promoted by global environmental NGOs and supported by the Ministry of Forestry, and on the other, a proposal for the largest palm oil plantation in the world (approx. 2 million ha) promoted by the Governor of East Kalimantan and supported by the Ministry of Agriculture (Potter, 2009). While these heterogeneities may have existed under Suharto, they were controlled and reduced by his centralized dictatorial system. As described by McLeod (2005): "With Soeharto's demise, Indonesia gained democracy but lost effective government....This franchise (the Suharto government) has disintegrated, its various component parts now working at cross-purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing fashion."
Leadership:
Formal leader
The government is led by an elected president.
Leadership authority:
High (3)
The President of Indonesia is very powerful, although not as powerful as under Suharto's "new order" regime. His power is now mitigated by the judicial and a legislative branches. See Fukuoka 2013, 2013b for details.
Actor group trust:
Low (1)
Missing in case. We have no evidence about this.
Personal communication:
More than once a year (5)
Different components of the government are in frequent (daily) communication. While we don't have direct evidence, we assume that at least some of this communication occurs in person (i.e. in govt. office buildings).
Remote communication:
More than once a year (5)
Different components of the government are in frequent (daily) communication. While we don't have direct evidence, we assume that at least some of this communication occurs remotely (i.e. through email or telephone).
Leadership accountability:
Medium (2)
The president is accountable to the general public (through elections and through the legislative and judicial branches), and the other sections of government make up a part of that group, however they are not the primary people to whom the president is accountable. Furthermore, there have been suggestions that even after the instigation of democracy, the government remains highly oligarchical (Fukuoka 2013) and that the main change has been a decentralization of patronage networks (previously centralized under Suharto) and a redistribution of riches to elites previously excluded from Suharto's group of allies (Fukukoka 2013b).
Actor group coordination:
Both formal and informal
As a set of government agencies, there is a large amount of formal coordination between agencies and between individuals within agencies.
Name:
Indonesian Local entrepreneurs
details
Past collaboration:
Low (1)
This is a group of people who have no definitive relationship with each other - consisting of small district level politicians and business people.
Costs of exit:
 
?
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
 
?
Interest heterogeneity:
High (3)
I think this should be medium or high, but I lack evidence?
Leadership:
No leader
There is no leadership for this group.
Leadership authority:
 
Not applicable.
Actor group trust:
Low (1)
Again, not sure how to do this one for this group.
Personal communication:
 
? Some members of this group communicate with each other, but it isn't clear to me how to fill out this variable, since the group as a whole doesn't communicate at any time.
Remote communication:
 
? Some members of this group communicate with each other, but it isn't clear to me how to fill out this variable, since the group as a whole doesn't communicate at any time.
Leadership accountability:
 
Not applicable.
Actor group coordination:
No coordination
This is a group of people who have no definitive relationship with each other - consisting of small district level politicians and business people.
Name:
Indonesian "Adat" Communities
details
Past collaboration:
High (3)
Under Suharto, levels of collaboration within and between adat communities were restricted by the state's non-recognition and violent suppression of cultural difference and ethnic identity. Still, levels of collaboration within "adat communities" appear to have been high, and specially after Suharto, when there was a re-invigoration of indigenous self-organization throughout the country (see Davidson and Henley 2007). Levels of collaboration between communities has been increasing since the 1990s, and currently appear to be high as evidenced by the effective mobilization of the Dayak socio-ecological movement and the AMAN natioanl organization. See e.g. Alcorn et al. (2003), Li (2002)
Costs of exit:
 
Missing in case
Proportionality (of costs and benefits):
 
Missing in case
Interest heterogeneity:
 
There are some highly publicized conflicts within and between villages, often labelled as inter-ethnic conflicts between some of the more than 1000 ethnic groups in Indonesia, such as those in East Timor, Central and West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Papua and the Malukus. This may be considered evidence of interest heterogeneity between the broad spectrum of groups considered as adat communities. Government data indicate that the number of village-level conflicts throughout Indonesia, as of 2002, was quite low - only 7% of villages- though some regions had much higher prevalence of conflict, such as Aceh (23% of villages), Maluku (15%), and NTB (14%), and there is significant underreporting in this data (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004). Aside from their presence, the factors driving these conflicts is also evidence of interest heterogeneity: endowment inequality and lack of dominance of a single ethnic group (though not ethnic diversity per se) are associated to conflict (Barron et al. 2004). On the other hand, there is ongoing collaboration between ethnic groups through e.g. AMAN, and thus heterogeneity cannot be that large to prevent cooperation. Note that the heterogeneity of interests becomes larger if we compare the interest of adat communities with those of the state, as evidenced by AMAN's constituting statement in 1999 -“If the state will not acknowledge us, then we will not acknowledge the state"- and the multiple struggles between adat communities sand state-approved forest projects, such as timber concessions, mining and palm oil plantations.
Leadership:
Informal leader
As with coordination, this question can be taken to refer to leadership at both the intra-group level (within each adat community) and the inter-group (between adat communities) level. Individual adat communities and inter-community adat movements have informal leadership, but there is also formal leadership of the adat through AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, the Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago).
Leadership authority:
 
Missing in case?
Actor group trust:
High (3)
Presumably levels of trust within groups are high. Between groups, trust may not be that high, as evidenced by conflicts between adat communities within an ethnic group and, more notably, between some ethnic groups.
Personal communication:
More than once a year (5)
Within groups, communication is frequent, between groups it is less frequent though also regular through social movements and organizations like AMAN.
Remote communication:
More than once a year (5)
Within groups, communication is frequent; between groups it is less frequent though also regular through social movements and organizations like AMAN.
Leadership accountability:
 
missing in case
Actor group coordination:
Both formal and informal
This question it refers to two types of collaboration: (1) within each adat community, ; and (2) between adat communities. Adat refers to systems of unwritten, traditional or customary law and as such is considered informal under Ostrom's typology. These informal rules regulate intra-community collaboration. Between adat communities, there has been informal collaboration. For instance, the Dayak in Borneo even had a political party before Suharto's regime, and in recent years a strong social movement has united many Dayak communities in a struggle for socio-ecological resilience; it creates a collective identity for the Dayak people by helping communities build solidarity to face loggers, map their territories, and renew traditional adat laws (Alcorn et al. 2003). Furthermore, adat communities have formally collaborated since 1999 through an organization - AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), the Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago- constituted with support from Jakarta-based NGOs and international donors (USAID, CUSO, and OXFAM among others), building upon a process of mobilization that began with the International Year of Indigenous People in 1993 (Li 2001). AMAN has been at the forefront of struggles against large-scale timber concessions, mining operations and palm oil plantations on indigenous territories.

Governance Systems

Name:
"Reformasi" Indonesian Forest Governance System, 1998-2012
details
Type of formal governance:
System of laws
This is a system of laws governing forest management.
End Date:
2012
Although the system was still in effect at the time of final coding (2014), it was being gradually transformed by the evolving REDD+ regime in Indonesia, and the implications of this are not yet clear, thus we chose to focus on the period ending in 2012
Begin date:
1998
This governance system began after the fall of Suharto's dictatorship in 1998.
Governance trigger:
Sudden disturbance
This governance system originated in the overthrow of a dictator (Suharto) who himself was overthrown as a result of an economic crisis, the ensuing social mobilizations, as well as a distancing between Suharto and previously supportive oligarchs.
Governance system description:
In 1998, power over forest management in Indonesia was reorganized as part of a broader process of democratization that followed the overthrow of Suharto. The resulting governance system was a complicated and multi-tiered system. Some authority to manage forests remained with the central government, which had authority over wildlife sanctuaries, the hiring of forest officials, and the granting of some forms of concessions (primarily large concessions). Authority over granting smaller concessions, as well as making decisions about other aspects of forests, were granted to District Authorities (the 3rd tier of government, after provinces which were granted little authority in the decentralization out of fear that they would encourage regional separatist movements). In addition, formal laws recognized the authority of traditional ("Adat") customary law, although this statute was left vague, and in practice higher level governments ignored adat laws (for example, by granting concessions for timber harvest, mining, or conversion to plantation agriculture (primarily oil palm). In 2004 a new forestry law shifted authority away from the district goverments and back towards the national forest authority, but de jure governance remained contested between these authorities.
Governance scale:
State-based policy
This is a nation-state, with state-based policy (i.e. governing forests within the country of Indonesia)
Centralization:
Somewhat decentralized (2)
After the fall of Suharto, the government of Indonesia has undergone various changes related to decentralization, both political and administrative. Competitive legislative elections began in 1999, marking the beginning of a multi-party political system with a less powerful central presidency. In 2001, the government began a devolution of power to the regions through decentralization and regional autonomy. Pepinsy (2012) argues that since then, "Indonesian politics ceased to be “about” Reformasi (despite the continued ubiquity of the term in political speech) and started being “about” the division of political authority in the center versus the regions, in contrast to the steep hierarchy with Jakarta at the top and the regions at the bottom." Although this program was not complete, and was also partially rolled back after 2004, it nonetheless shifted significant powers from central to relatively more local actors (provinces and districts). In some cases, local communities with proof of ownership have obtained the rights of management, and in some regions such as East Kalimantan are permitting communities to manage small-scale forest areas in cooperatives. Moreover, in some national protected areas there have been pilot collaborative governance arrangements with communities. However, overall most communities still have very little say in forest management. On the other hand, the new, more independent court system has also been an important venue for channeling local claims over forest rights, although to date decisions have not favored decentralization. For instance, the Dayak used the court system to ask for the withdrawal of concessions in West Kalimantan and seek retributions from loss of timber benefits, and environmental and cultural damages from these concessions; many villagers have brought this type of challenge during the Reformasi (Potter, 2009). For more details on this partial decentralization, see e.g. Ardiansyah & Jotzo (2013), Arnold (2008), McCarthy (2004).
Name:
"New Order" Indonesian Forest Governance System, 1965-1998
details
Type of formal governance:
System of laws
This was a formal governance system based on a nation state, and thus is a system of laws.
End Date:
1998
In 1998 a serious economic crisis led to massive protests which ended Suharto's government. A new democratic governance regime was created which was substantially different from Suharto's dictatorship.
Begin date:
1965
This governance system began with a political crisis in 1965 that enabled Suharto, then the head of the military, to begin undermining the rule of Sukarno, the previous ruler of Indonesia. The transition to Suharto's dictatorship took 3 years, ending in 1968 when Suharto took full control of the government.
Governance trigger:
Sudden disturbance
The initiation of Suharto's dictatorship was the result of a rather complicated set of coups and counter-coups that shook Indonesia in 1965, however they were certainly a sudden disturbance, and not a gradual change.
Governance system description:
The government of Suharto from 1965-1998 drew on past governmental traditions, including the Dutch colonial state and Sukarno's government, but also developed new patterns of its own. Unlike Sukarno before him, Suharto encouraged various forms of foreign direct investment and private capital accumulation. He also increased the centralization of an already centralized post-colonial state, weakening local government and formally de-recognizing systems of customary rights for the adat (i.e. indigenous) communities. Forest governance was formally vested in a forestry ministry based in Jakarta, but with weak on the ground presence on the outer islands. Large concessions granted to members of the military and other allies of Suharto were essentially free to use forest resources as they saw fit, and could call on the military to help them deal with restive local populations.
Governance scale:
State-based policy
This was a nation state.
Centralization:
Highly centralized (4)
The governance system centered in an individual dictator who centralized power around him and was supported by a very close group of extremely loyal allies. Important decisions were made by Suharto or by government agencies working under him (following his orders) and based in Jakarta, the capital city.

Environmental Commons

Name:
Forests in Indonesia
details
Productivity:
Very productive (3)
These are moist tropical forests - they are very productive - comparable to Amazon rainforests.
Commons spatial extent:
1904569
This is the land area of Indonesia. It appears that nearly all of Indonesia was forested into the early 20th century. During the time of study, the percentage of Indonesia that was forested has declined, but we view all of Indonesia as potentially forested. Global Forest Watch (2002) estimate that forests in Indonesia covered 1,622,900 km2 in 1950, 1,197,000 km2 in 1985, and 1,000,000 km2 in 1997. Hansen et al (2013) estimate total tree cover in Indonesia as 1,417,000 Km2, but estimate a deforestation rate during the period from 2005-2012 as 16,000 km2 per year.
Environmental medium:
Terrestrial
Forests are terrestrial ecosystems.
Commons heterogeneity:
Low (1)
Forests are fairly continuously distributed throughout Indonesia, although they are systematically cleared in some areas.
Intra annual predictability:
High (3)
Like most forests, there is little intrannual change in the prevalence of the forest, although some specific non-timber forest products are seasonal. As with inter-annual predictability, forest fires, which are not fully predictable, may affect the availability of this commons unexpectedly.
Inter annual predictability:
High (3)
Like most forests, there is little interannual change in the prevalence of the forest. However, forest fires, which are not fully predictable, may affect the availability of this commons unexpectedly.
Technical substitute:
Yes
Wood is the primary resource extracted from the forest, and most, if not all, wood products can be substituted with non-wood products - i.e. structural timber with steel or bamboo or engineered wood products, most other uses engineered wood products, pulp with pulp from annual crops. Some subsistence uses are less easily substitutable because subsistence users are poorly integrated into markets.
Commons boundaries:
Clear boundaries (3)
The physical boundaries of the forests in Indonesia are clear. The forests are surrounded either by water (they are on islands) or by agricultural land, or by national borders (e.g. forests in Kalimantan, in the island of Borneo, which border with Malaysa). National borders may be the least clear of these boundaries, but they are nonetheless clear.
Commons renewability:
Renewable (1)
Forests in this environment grow back fairly rapidly (although in some extreme circumstances of forest clearing, they may not easily grow back).
Commons accessibility:
Very accessible (3)
The accessibility of forests in Indonesia has varied substantially over time and space, however throughout the period under study, some forests in Indonesia have been very accessible to some users, and this has aided various forms of commercial and subsistence exploitation. Over time, the accessibility of some areas and its forest resources has changed with certain development policies, causing significant changes on resource use. For instance, the region of Kalimantan in the border with Malaysia in the island of Borneo was a remote region inhabited by the forest-dependent Dayak tribe and used for smuggling, but without large-scale forest use. Later, Suharto gave a very large timber concession (to PT Yamaker Corp.), covering all accessible lands within 20 km of the border, 843,500 ha in West and 265,000 ha in East Kalimantan. The corporation and its subcontractors "quickly turned the concessions into vehicles for illegal logging and cross-border trading." (Potter, 2009). In the 1990s, the first significant palm oil plantations began to emerge in the region. The construction in the early 1990s of part of the north link of the Trans-Kalimantan Highway, running close to the border, made the Danau Sentarum, a low-lying area of lakes and swamp forest, much more accesible, making it a resource frontier with increased pressure from the expansion of palm oil. In this decade, three national parks were declared in the region; in 2002 one of these parks was the first to establish collaborative governance with local government and indigenous groups (Eghenter et al. 2003). In the 2000s, the increased accessibility of the region facilitated the proposal for the largest palm oil plantation project in the world, with almost 2 million ha. The project was not developed due in part to pressures from international conservation groups. However, despite these regional dynamics, it is important to note that to this day, significant areas of forests on islands such as some regions in Borneo and Papua New Guinea remain inaccessible for commercial users and even for some subsistence users.

Component Interactions

Governance Interaction

Indonesian Forest Governance Interactions (Reformasi: 1998-2012)

1998-05-22 to 2012-06-01

Governing Organization:
"Reformasi" Indonesian Central Government (1998-2012) (Actor)
Commons User:
Indonesian Local entrepreneurs (Actor)
Governs:
"Reformasi" Indonesian Forest Governance System, 1998-2012 (Governance System)
Commons User:
Indonesian "Adat" Communities (Actor)
Primary:
Forests in Indonesia (Environmental Common)
Commons User:
Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia (Actor)
Commons User:
Civil society organizations in Indonesia (Actor)
Governing Organization:
Indonesian District Governments (Actor)

Governance Interaction

Indonesian Forest Governance Interactions (New Order: 1965-1998)

1965-09-30 to 1998-05-21

Primary:
Forests in Indonesia (Environmental Common)
Commons User:
Indonesian "Adat" Communities (Actor)
Governs:
"New Order" Indonesian Forest Governance System, 1965-1998 (Governance System)
Commons User:
Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia (Actor)
Governing Organization:
"New Order" Indonesian Central Government (1965-1998) (Actor)

Studies

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Davidson, Jamie S. and Henley, Davide. 2007. The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics. The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism, London & New York: Routledge, Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, 377 p.


Alcorn, J.B., Bamba, J., Masiun, S., Natalia, I., and Royo, A.G. 2003. Keeping ecological resilience afloat in cross-scale turbulence: an indigenous social movement navigates change in Indonesia. In F. Berkes, J. Colding, and C. Holling (eds.) Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Universitry Press, pp. 299-327.


Li, Tanya M. 2001. Masyarakat Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia's Forest Zone. Modern Asian Studies, no. 35(3):645-676. 


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