|Variable Component Type||Actor|
|Theme||Social capital (learn about themes)|
|Question||How high is the level of past collaboration within this group?|
|Select Options||1 Low, 2 Medium, 3 High|
|Importance||The history of collaboration within a group is indicative of trust, reciprocity, and established means of communicating and acting collectively. It could be a source of confidence in addressing commons dilemmas, or could suggest path-dependence and a lack of new thinking.|
"Collaboration refers to working together. A group can work together on issues of resource and environmental sustainability or on other, un-related activities. These past experiences build established ways of communicating and cooperating which can have direct or indirect implications for how a group may function on an ongoing or new resource management problem. Low: No or very minimal past collaboration. The members of this group have not engaged in meaningful collective-action in the past, or if they have, this has not produced long-lasting relationships among the members. High: The members of this group have engaged in multiple and sustained past collaborative efforts. These efforts have created meaningful relationships among the members and created reputations among the members for their tendency to collaborate. High levels of trust have resulted from these efforts."
|Past collaboration and social capital||High|
|Conditions for general resilience||Moderate or High|
|Decentralization and local capacity||Low|
|"New Order" Indonesian Central Government (1965-1998)||High (3)||The members of the government of Indonesia worked very closely together during this period, although to be fair, it was probably largely due to central coordination as opposed to trust between members.|
|Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia||Does this refer to inter or intra group?|
|Indonesian Local entrepreneurs||Low (1)||This is a group of people who have no definitive relationship with each other - consisting of small district level politicians and business people.|
|Ozone Nation States||Low (1)|
|ICCAT Contracting Parties||High (3)||ICCAT was created in 1966, and began to undertake management activities for fisheries among member states in 1969. It has a long history of coordinating regulation of fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean and over time has regulated an increasing number of fisheries and added a number of additional contracting parties.|
|Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers||High (3)||Past collaboration was lower and more collusive prior to the Montreal Protocol. It then declined as DuPont altered its position in favor of regulations unilaterally. Post-Protocol it became highly collaborative again.|
|ICCAT Eastern Members||Medium (2)||A large fraction of member states collaborate frequently on governance issues as part of the European Union. However, there are several states that receive quota such as Japan, Algeria, Morocco, Croatia, the Former Yugoslavia, Korea. Tunisia and Turkey that are not part of the EU and thus collaborate less frequently.|
|ICPR nations (1976-1986)||Medium (2)||A Salmon Commission had been created to control fishing efforts; there was also the precedent of navigation agreements; collaboration was not high, however, as the relatively failure of the Salmon commission shows; this can be related also to the relatively recent II world war.|
|Galapagos Artisan Fishermen||Low (1)||No long history in the area. Little collaboration regarding fishery yields and minimum landing size occurred prior to the establishment of the fishing cooperatives and Participatory Management Board mandated under the Galapagos Special Law.|
|ICCAT Western Members||Medium (2)||The Canada, US and Japan interact frequently on global governance issues in organizations such as the G8|
|GBR fisheries managers||High (3)||The agency has demonstrated state-level collaboration within its agency that has enabled key changes to fisheries policy and management.|
|GBR commercial fishers||Medium (2)||Collaboration within specific sectors, such as operators within the trawl fishery, may be high at particular times (e.g., when management changes are happening). However, collaboration across sectors (trawl and net, for example) are only really evident through membership of the Queensland Seafood Industry Association (QSIA) and various workshops, which are moderate / medium.|
|ICPR nations (1986-2000)||Medium (2)||See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"|
|Rhine chemical firms||Medium (2)||Collaboration at the European level was not fully developed . (see also "coordination" variable)|
|Rhine agricultural sector||High (3)||The agricultural lobby at the European level is generally well known for its cohesiveness and effectiveness .|
|Indonesian District Governments||Low (1)||Although it is not clear if this refers to Inter or intra group, it doesn't matter, because past levels of collaboration were low, as prior to 1998, district governments were almost entirely unempowered.|
|"Reformasi" Indonesian Central Government (1998-2012)||Medium (2)||Different agencies of the central government have worked closely with each other in the past, and employees have worked closely between them within particular agencies. However, reviews of Indonesian forest governance have noted that agencies have shown "little effective coordination" in actions against illegal logging (Barr, 2001) and overall in the implementation of forest management and land allocation policies (Brockhaus et al. 2012). There have also been recurring conflicts between the central and the district authorities in the implementation of forest laws, including the concession system (e.g. McCarthy 2004, McLeod, 2005) and participatory forestry schemes (e.g. Nomura, . As described by McLeod (2005): "With Soeharto's demise, Indonesia gained democracy but lost effective government....This franchise (the Suharto government) has disintegrated, its various component parts now working at cross-purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing fashion."|
|Civil society organizations in Indonesia||Medium (2)||Lack of coordination between NGOs from different sectors has been noted as one of the weaknesses of these organizations, characterized as sectoral and fragmented (Antlove et al. 2005) At the same time, there are some incipient collaboration efforts between NGOs formalized in organizations at regional and national levels. At the national level there is YAPPIKA, a national NGO alliance for civil society and democracy. YAPPIKA "implemented a program starting in 2000 to assess the health of Indonesian civil society using the CIVICUS Index on Civil Society. The objectives of the assessment included increasing the knowledge and understanding of the status of civil society in Indonesia, empowering civil society stakeholders through dialog and networking, and providing civil society with tools to analyze sector-wide strengths and weaknesses, as well as to develop strategies to foster positive social change." (Antlove et al. 2005). Among other things, they have held participatory dialogues with more than 400 civil society organizations. At the regional level, there are examples such as the Consortium for the Development of Civil Society (KPMM), created in 2000 in West Sumatra by twelve NGOs to try to address the lack of accountability among civil society organizations in the province. To do so, KPMM developed a code of ethics and standard operational procedures for its membership organizations. However, as of 2005, three of the initial twelve NGOs had left the organization because they felt that the code of ethics was too strict. So, overall, we could say past collaboration was initially low but has been growing over the years.|
|National Marine Sanctuaries Office of NOAA||High (3)||The group regularly meets and discusses activities within and amongst the three sanctuaries. There are multiple offices but they often work together.|
|Raja Ampat Tourism||Not Applicable|
|Wakatobi Bajau fishers||High (3)||Strong cultural history. Strong social capital within the group - e.g. catch sharing|
|Indonesian "Adat" Communities||High (3)||Under Suharto, levels of collaboration within and between adat communities were restricted by the state's non-recognition and violent suppression of cultural difference and ethnic identity. Still, levels of collaboration within "adat communities" appear to have been high, and specially after Suharto, when there was a re-invigoration of indigenous self-organization throughout the country (see Davidson and Henley 2007). Levels of collaboration between communities has been increasing since the 1990s, and currently appear to be high as evidenced by the effective mobilization of the Dayak socio-ecological movement and the AMAN natioanl organization. See e.g. Alcorn et al. (2003), Li (2002)|
|NWHI Monument Co-Trusteeship||Low (1)||Although some of the agencies have worked together in other areas before - there had not been such a collaboration in this area or to this extent, so coded as low.|
|Riparian Nations (1976-1986)|
|Wakatobi managers||Medium (2)||NGOs have been in the region for about 10 yrs, started informal collaborations prior to formal agreement. Decentralization occurred in 1999 - central and local gov collaborations - Indonesia one of the first examples. Not coded as high because the partnership is fairly new, both between NGOS, and NGOs + government.|
|Raja Ampat Managers||Medium (2)||High past collaboration for communities (long-term traditional management), but NGOs arrived in the area in 2001 and the Raja Ampat Regency was inaugurated in 2003 - so overall coded as medium|
|Australian Toothfish Fishers||High (3)||Although the companies may compete for access to fishing grounds, they have worked together to obtain sustainability certification (through the MSC) and must continue to work together to maintain this certification. Further, they are members of COLTO and accordingly have worked, and continue to work together, to lobby for legal toothfish operators and to take action against illegal fishing (E.g., Osterblom and Sumaila 2011).|
|NWHI Researchers||Medium (2)||Some researchers are likely to have collaborated in the past|
|CORALINA||High (3)||Considering their initial success in creating the MPA and running it, I imagine is high.|
|GMR managers||Low (1)||The two-tier governance framework of the PMB and IMA was established in 1998 with the Galapagos Special Law|
|Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers||High (3)||Strong cultural history. Strong social capital within the group - e.g. sasi marine management|
|Macquarie Island Managers||Medium (2)||Managers do collaborate on the management of the MPA and Nature Reserve.|
|Charles Darwin Foundation||High (3)||CDF has been in operation since 1959|
|Galapagos Tourism Sector||High (3)||The first “tour ship” that stopped in the islands was probably the Trans Pacific cruise ship Stella Polaris in 1934. The industry was promoted duirng the 1970s, and there was modest growth in 1970s and between 1974 and 1980, tourism began to expand in earnest. Epler, B. 2007. Tourism, the Economy, Population Growth, and Conservation in Galapagos|
|California Sanctuary Recreational Users||Low (1)||Often times users are focused on their particular excursion. Whale watching vessels coordinate amongst each other. Recreational fishermen communicate conditions to each other.|
|California State and Federal Fisheries Agencies||High (3)||The PFMC and CDFW meet regularly, in person as well as communicating through other means.|
|California Academic Researchers||High (3)||Many of the research projects are a collaboration of multiple institutions, or at least a larger team of researchers from the same institution. SIMoN was created to serve as a network to provide easily accessible information about each project to other members, allowing further collaboration and to build upon each others work. Some projects are not in conjunction with others, however all are reported SIMoN affiliates and to the broader research community.|
|Australian Fisheries Management Authority||High (3)||The AFMA was established in 1992 and members have had to work together since then in managing a wide variety of fisheries throughout Australia's EEZ (which is the third largest in the world).|
|Svalbard Tourism||High (3)||Before AECO was formally established, there is evidence of past collaboration. Since the Svalbard community is very small (2000 people in the largest town), companies likely all knew one another and had a least some coordination of itineraries. In recognition of the growing numbers of tourists (although perhaps also partly due to the government desire to create a management plan) the tourism industry worked together to create their own management plan in 1994 outlining how they wish to see the industry operate.|
|Svalbard Resource Managers||High (3)||The actors within this group have been around for several decades (Governor since 1920, Polar Institute since 1986, Coast Guard since 1977).|
|GBR government co-managers||High (3)||The co-management arrangements have been in place in policy, law and practice since designation of the MPA.|
|Svalbard Shrimp Fishers||Missing||Unknown|
|GBR recreational fishers||Medium (2)||These associations are not new. They are well established but do not have high representation hence their history of collaboration is medium.|
|Galapagos Charles Darwin Foundation||High (3)||CDF has been in operation since 1959|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Director of National Parks||High (3)||The Director of National Parks and the senior executives are working under the same guidelines and for similar objectives.|
|Cenderwasih managers||Not Applicable|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers||High (3)||Collaboration across sectors are evident through membership in the CFA, which comprises voting membership covering 90% of Commonwealth fishery-specific industry Associations and whose membership represents over 95% of the Gross Value of Production (GVP) of Commonwealth managed fisheries. CFA was formed in April 2002, so this collaboration was not evident for the entire snapshot coded for this case.|
|California Groundfish Fishermen||Medium (2)||Risk pools are a form of fishermen collaboration, where fishermen will combine quotas to reduce risk of one of them overfishing a certain species. However, competition is still high amongst fishermen. Fishermen collaborate in professional organizations as well (e.g. Fishermen's Marketing Association).|
|Australian Antarctic Division||Medium (2)||Members have to collaborate on a variety of management measures, research activities, gathering data (e.g., for the HIMI MPA proposal). Many members have worked for the AAD for years to decades.|
|Cenderwasih fishers||High (3)||Tribes and clans have a long history in the area|
|Seaflower artisanal fishers||High (3)||They needed to collaborate and cooperate since they formed cooperatives.|
|New Zealand Fishery Managers||High (3)||Teams work together closely. High turnover rate, but collaboration built into system.|
|New Zealand Arrow Squid Fishers||High (3)||Before DWG there was the Squid Management Company. Long history of working together|
|Falkland Islands Government (FIG) Fisheries Managers||High (3)||Management has collaborated since its inception|
|Association of Users in the Caete-Teperacu RESEX (ASSUREMACATA) in Brazil||High (3)|
|Lombok aquaculture farmers||High (3)||Most farmers consider aquaculture in the area to be a part of their family history in the community.|
|California market squid fishermen||High (3)||Families help coordinate. Producers association helps formalize already existing close network.|
|Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI||Not Applicable|
|Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio)||Missing|
|California Department of Fish and Wildlife Market Squid Managers||High (3)||Highly collaborate together. Frequent meetings, roles require frequent collaboration. CPS and HMS are on same team.|
|Gili EcoTrust on Gili Trawangan||High (3)|
|Brazilian Institute of the Environment & Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA)||Missing|
|Isla Caballo AMPR Costa Rica||Low (1)|
|Paquera-Tambor AMPR Costa Rica||Medium (2)|
|SCUBA diving businesses on Gili Trawangan||High (3)|
|Gili Indah Dive Association (GIDA)||High (3)|
|Palito-Montero AMPR Costa Rica||High (3)|
|Secretary of State for the Environment of Pará (SEMA) in Brazil||Missing|
|Misool Eco Resort|
|Patagonian Squid Trawlers||High (3)||Companies used to compete for quota but would collaborate on fishing and the market, but now only compete in the market and generally this doesn't change too much. They collaborate in FIFCA together (and the Loligo Producers Association which is a subgroup of FIFCA).|
Basic:A basic variable describes essential and basic background information for a component.
Biophysical:Biophysical variables describe just that: important biophysical properties, largely of environmental commons, that are not captured by a more specific theme.
Causation:A variable with this theme describes issues of causality, which is a complex subject. Most basically this theme is associated with variables that describe different types of causation and different types of causes of environmental problems.
Context:contextual variable relates the component with which it associated to the social and/or ecological setting of a particular interaction and/or case.
Ecosystem services:Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or describe the provision of important ecosystem services by a natural resource.
Enforcement:Enforcement involves several different processes, including monitoring for violations of rules, sanctioning violators, and conflict resolution mechanisms involved in this process. Variables that relate to any of these processes should be attached to this theme.
External:Variables with this theme relate a component to processes external to the case with which the component is associated.
Heterogeneity:Variables with this theme describe important ways in which the member of an actor group differ from each other.
Incentives: This theme is associated with variables that are not directly related to institutions and rules, but which still play a role in affecting the incentives that commons users have to ameliorate or exacerbate the commons they use.
Institutional-biophysical linkage:This is a sub-theme of the institutions theme, and describes those variables that ask about the relationship between a set of institutions and a biophysical aspect of a commons.
Institutions:Variables with this theme describe the social institutions (rules, property rights) that are used to organize and direct human behavior. It does not include monitoring and enforcement of these institutions, as these are associated with the Enforcement theme.
Knowledge and uncertainty:Variables with this theme describe levels of knowledge that actor groups have regarding a commons, as well as factors that affect how much uncertainty there is in the status and dynamics of that commons.
Leadership:Leaders play an important role in commons management, most traditionally by providing for public goods needed to organize commons users. But there are other possible roles, and variables associated with this theme can relate to any role that a leader might play in an interaction.
Outcomes:This theme is attached to variables that deal with any outcomes that are produced by the actions of relevant actors in an interaction.
Resource renewability:Variables associated with this theme deal with the ability of a natural resource to be highly productive and renewable.
Social capital:Social capital captures the processes that enable the members of an actor group to work effectively together. Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or in some way express the level of social capital among members of a group.
Spatial:Variables associated with the Spatial theme describe important spatial patterns or dynamics, such as the spatial heterogeneity of a commons, or whether or not a user group resides within a particular commons.
Technology:This theme is attached to variables that consider the role that technology and infrastructure have in affecting commons outcomes.