| Variable Type | Ordinal |
|---|---|
| Variable Component Type | Actor |
| Variable Kind | Interaction |
| Theme | Institutions (learn about themes) |
| Projects | SESMAD, Fiji fisheries |
| Question | Regardless of how many rights are owned by each member, how much variation is there in the amounts that the members actually withdraw or emit? |
| Select Options | 1 Low, 2 Moderate, 3 High |
| Unit | |
| Role | CommonsUser |
| Importance | Excessive use right heterogeneity may be perceived as unfair by those members who have disproportionately few use rights. These members may be less likely to cooperate. |
| Definition | "This variable records how much variation there is in the extent of use rights granted to the members of this group. Use rights refer to the right to obtain products from a resource (e.g. catch fish, appropriate water) or to emit a given pollutant. Low heterogeneity indicates that most members have the same number of use rights. High heterogeneity indicates that a small subset of members have a disproportionate number or majority of the use rights." |
| Sectors |
Theory Usages
| Theory | Value Used |
|---|
Associated Studies
| Study Citation |
|---|
Case Usages
| Case | Interaction Type | Component | Value Used | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Indonesian "Adat" Communities | Low (1) | Most individual members of this community shared the same (lack of) rights, and extracted small quantities from the forest. |
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia | Moderate (2) | Some concessions were much larger than others. However, all members of this group by definition had access to large extractive concessions |
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Indonesian "Adat" Communities | ? not clear how to answer this, as many members here do not have formal rights. | |
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia | Moderate (2) | All members of this group have some rights to extract resources, however the scale of these operations vary from large multinational companies with large holdings of concessions to companies with much more limited holdings, that do much less withdrawl. |
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Civil society organizations in Indonesia | does this group have rights? I don't think so | |
| Forests in Indonesia | Governance | Indonesian Local entrepreneurs | Moderate (2) | some members of this group are very active as small-medium scale land users. Others are active primarily as local politicians who may benefit from certain kinds of activities, but are not leading those activities. |
| Montreal Protocol | Governance | Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers | Missing | Rights granting process varies by country. Most countries allocate rights to produce ODS first by considering the availability of substitutes for particular uses, and then use one or more additional methods to assign rights within sectors. |
| International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) | Governance | ICPR nations (1976-1986) | ||
| International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) | Governance | Rhine chemical firms | ||
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR recreational fishers | Low (1) | No-one has a right to extract corals |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR recreational fishers | Low (1) | No-one has a right to extract corals |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Moderate (2) | The fishing quota is relatively evenly distributed among operators in this fishery |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Moderate (2) | Rights - through licenses and quota - are relatively evenly distributed in these fisheries (compared to for example Northern territory fisheries). |
| Montreal Protocol | Governance | Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers | Missing | |
| Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR) | Governance | Galapagos Artisan Fishermen | Low (1) | All fishers are subject to same rules within GMR |
| Macquarie Island Marine Park | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | Moderate (2) | One company owns rights to approximately 70% of quota; while the other company owns rights to the remaining 30% |
| Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR) | Governance | Galapagos Tourism Sector | Moderate (2) | A variety of operators - from small-scale to high-end. Permits designed to favour small-scale tourism. All tourists and tourism operators subject to same rules within GMR. |
| Wakatobi National Park | Governance | Wakatobi Bajau fishers | Low (1) | Resource is ultimately open access, but fish spawning areas are no-take. All the Bajao are subject to the same rules. |
| Wakatobi National Park | Governance | Wakatobi Bajau fishers | Low (1) | All fishers are subject to same rules and export of turtles is banned. |
| Wakatobi National Park | Governance | Wakatobi Bajau fishers | Low (1) | Destructive practices, such as coral mining are banned and this applies to all Bajau |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Sanctuary Recreational Users | Recreational users do not withdraw this species. | |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Academic Researchers | Low (1) | Researchers do not withdraw whales. |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Academic Researchers | Low (1) | Researchers do not use the habitat, except for occasional research projects, but permits are allocated for such uses. |
| Community A (Fiji fisheries) | Governance | Community A | Moderate (2) | Coefficient of variation for income on an average day falls between 0.33 and 0.66. |
| Community B (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community B | Low (1) | |
| Community C (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community C | Moderate (2) | |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | Low (1) | destructive practices are banned |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Tourism | Not Applicable | |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | Low (1) | All fishers are subject to same rules with regard to turtles |
| Raja Ampat (National Act No. 32 2004) | Governance | Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers | Low (1) | All subject to same rules - although some differences across the different MPAs in terms of area of no take |
| Svalbard Nature Reserves | Governance | Svalbard Tourism | Not Applicable | |
| Central California National Marine Sanctuaries | Governance | California Groundfish Fishermen | High (3) | Quotas are allocated according to previous fishing history. Thus, some fishermen are not allocated any quota for certain fisheries, and portfolios vary widely by fisherman and by gear and target grounds. Various gear types determine quantity of catch. |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR recreational fishers | Low (1) | Regulations (bag limits, fishing zones) apply equally to all rec fishers |
| Community F (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community F | High (3) | |
| Great Australian Bight Marine Park (GABMP) (Commonwealth Waters) | Governance | GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Svalbard Nature Reserves | Governance | Svalbard Shrimp Fishers | Moderate (2) | Instead of being managed by quotas, the fishery is managed by the number of fishing days, fishing vessels, and gear regulations (NAFO 2012b). The majority of boats use similar gear – either two or three trawls (occasionally four trawls). Therefore, there are going to be difference in the efficiency of each boat, but not enormous differences in extraction. |
| Great Australian Bight Marine Park (GABMP) (Commonwealth Waters) | Governance | GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | Moderate (2) | Quotas are allocated according to previous fishing history. Each Statutory Fishing Rights entitles the holder to receive an equal portion of the TAC set by AFMA for the current period. |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Macquarie Island Marine Park | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | Low (1) | No light-mantled albatross have been caught as bycatch by any of the fishers; however the management plan sets a bycatch limit of 0.01 per 1000 hooks set |
| Heard and McDonald Islands Marine Reserve | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | Low (1) | |
| Heard and McDonald Islands Marine Reserve | Governance | Australian Toothfish Fishers | Missing | |
| Great Australian Bight Marine Park (GABMP) (Commonwealth Waters) | Governance | GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers | Low (1) | |
| Svalbard Nature Reserves | Governance | Svalbard Tourism | Not Applicable | |
| Community D (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community D | Low (1) | There is little heterogeneity in catches among community members. |
| Community E (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community E | Moderate (2) | |
| Community G (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community G | Low (1) | |
| Community H (Fiji Fisheries) | Governance | Community H | Low (1) | |
| Great Barrier Reef Marine Park | Governance | GBR commercial fishers | Low (1) | All fishers excluded from no-take zones. Trawlers also excluded from other zones but rules are relatively evenly applied. |
| Seaflower MPA | Governance | Seaflower artisanal fishers | Not Applicable | |
| Seaflower MPA | Governance | Seaflower artisanal fishers | Low (1) | All artisanal fishers with the license can harvest the resource. There seem to be no differentiation. |
| Cenderwasih National Park | Governance | Cenderwasih fishers | Low (1) | All fishers subject to same rules |
| Cenderwasih National Park | Governance | Cenderwasih fishers | Low (1) | All fishers subject to same rules |
| Falkland Islands squid | Governance | Patagonian Squid Trawlers | Low (1) | Quota divided (in 2016 by 7 companies) - lowest % at 4%, highest at 18%, average about 14% - mostly the same |
| New Zealand squid | Governance | New Zealand Arrow Squid Fishers | Moderate (2) | Depends on quota allocation. 7 companies. No one can have more than 45%. |
| California squid | Governance | California market squid fishermen | Low (1) | Catch about the same, at least capacity to catch same, no restrictions. |
| Pond aquaculture on Lombok, Indonesia | Governance | Lombok aquaculture farmers | Missing | |
| Pond aquaculture on Lombok, Indonesia | Governance | Lombok aquaculture farmers | ||
| Caete-Teperacu Extractive Reserve (RESEX) in Braganca, Brazil | Governance | Association of Users in the Caete-Teperacu RESEX (ASSUREMACATA) in Brazil | Not Applicable | |
| Gili Trawangan Coastal Tourism | Governance | SCUBA diving businesses on Gili Trawangan | ||
| Gili Trawangan Coastal Tourism | Governance | Gili Indah Dive Association (GIDA) | Missing | |
| Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica fisheries governance | Governance | Isla Caballo AMPR Costa Rica | Low (1) | |
| Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica fisheries governance | Governance | Palito-Montero AMPR Costa Rica | Low (1) | |
| Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica fisheries governance | Governance | Paquera-Tambor AMPR Costa Rica | Moderate (2) |