|Variable Component Type||Actor|
|Theme||Social capital (learn about themes)|
|Projects||SESMAD, Fiji fisheries|
|Question||How high is the level of trust between members of this group?|
|Select Options||1 Low, 2 Medium, 3 High|
|Importance||Without substantial trust in among members of an actor group, it is very hard to establish cooperation in the management of a shared environmental commons. It is understood that reciprocity and trust and strongly related; as individuals reciprocate, reputation of being trustworthy increases thus contributing to enduring reciprocity (Ostrom and Walker 2002).|
"Trust is the firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability or strength of another actor (group). High: actors have full faith and confidence in one another to fullfill promises. Low: actors have no or very little faith or confidence that others will fullfill their promises."
|Conditions for general resilience||Moderate or High|
|Past collaboration and social capital||High|
|Communication and collective action||High|
|Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)||High|
|Indonesian District Governments||missing in case|
|"Reformasi" Indonesian Central Government (1998-2012)||Low (1)||Missing in case. We have no evidence about this.|
|Large Extractive Industries in Indonesia||Does this refer to inter or intra group?|
|Indonesian Local entrepreneurs||Low (1)||Again, not sure how to do this one for this group.|
|Ozone Nation States||Missing in case|
|Ozone Depleting Substance Industrial Producers||Medium (2)|
|ICPR nations (1976-1986)||Medium (2)||There was enough trust to sign the Chemicals Convention but not enough to implement it; lack of confidence among countries in that regard manifested in a too procedural approach to pollution control (black and grey lists of pollutants and their concentration thresholds).|
|Galapagos Artisan Fishermen||Medium (2)||Fishermen wouldf come toegther for meetings and organise themselves when issues affected them, and therefore assume there must be some level of trust for the cooperative to function in this manner.|
|Civil society organizations in Indonesia||?|
|ICCAT Contracting Parties|
|ICCAT Western Members|
|ICCAT Eastern Members||N/A|
|GBR recreational fishers||Missing||Missing in case|
|GBR fisheries managers||Not Applicable|
|GBR commercial fishers||High (3)||Commercial fishing sectors do not generally compete with each other. Their interests vis-a-vis regulation, conservation, market changes tend to be similar. Therefore trust is assumed to be high. There are no research studies we are aware of that specifically investigate trust.|
|ICPR nations (1986-2000)||High (3)||The moderate heterogeneity of interests and the room left by the governance system (Rhine Action Plan) favored a climate of trust|
|Rhine chemical firms|
|Rhine agricultural sector|
|GBR government co-managers||High (3)||GBRMPA and QPWS seemingly demonstrate high levels of consensus and trust.|
|"New Order" Indonesian Central Government (1965-1998)||High (3)||The regime operated through a small and very tight-knight group of allies which Suharto trusted; this trust was based on family ties, on proving useful to Suharto, not having a political agenda that would challenge Suharto in any way, and of course not criticizing the regime. As a Machiavellian, Suharto had a good instinct for whom to trust. For instance, BJ Habibie, one of Suharto's closest allies, won his trust showing persistent obeisance (strong deferential respect), and having usefulness in technological knowledge and in mobilizing the community of Muslim 'modernist' intellectuals, though there was also a personal friendship to Suharto dating back to much before the New Order (Amir, 2007); meanwhile, Azwar Anas won Suharto's trust due to his ability to integrate West Sumatra into Indonesia's unitary state, and later secured his position by allying with Habibie (Prasetyawan, 2006). The importance of trust between Suharto and his close allies could also be seen in the recent interpretation of his regime's fall as a result of increasing tensions (i.e. the breakdown of trust and reciprocity) between Suharto and previously loyal oligarchs (see Fukukoka, 2013).|
|Indonesian "Adat" Communities||High (3)||Presumably levels of trust within groups are high. Between groups, trust may not be that high, as evidenced by conflicts between adat communities within an ethnic group and, more notably, between some ethnic groups.|
|National Marine Sanctuaries Office of NOAA||High (3)||All members are working under the same guidelines and for similar objectives.|
|Raja Ampat Tourism||High (3)||Focus is mandated to be local-level ecotourism or homestay. Can ahve outside investment, but must be majority (80%) local staff. Number of liveaboards are capped and there are tax breaks for homestays.|
|Raja Ampat Managers||High (3)||MPAs were set up as a collaboration from the outset so trust is very high (M.Erdmann pers comm)|
|NWHI Monument Co-Trusteeship||Medium (2)||Low at the start of the time period being coded but now is considereably better - A. Wilhelm pers comm.|
|Riparian Nations (1976-1986)|
|Wakatobi Bajau fishers||High (3)||Strong cultural history. Strong social capital within the group - e.g. catch sharing|
|Australian Antarctic Division||Missing|
|GMR managers||Low (1)||It would have been low at the start and for the majaority of the time period being coded as there was a lot of conflict. However the IMA has not needed to meet in the last few years and so it could now be considered medium?|
|NWHI Researchers||Medium (2)||Depending on funding and personalities this is probably medium|
|Raja Ampat Artisanal Fishers||High (3)|
|Macquarie Island Managers||Missing|
|Charles Darwin Foundation||High (3)||Likely fairly high, as it is a research community with more or less converging interests.|
|Galapagos Tourism Sector||High (3)||Assume fairly high - no reports of conflict within the sector|
|Community D||High (3)||4/5: This value indicates that on average respondents trust more than distrust (4) other members of the community.|
|Seaflower artisanal fishers||High (3)||Based on the continuous engagement of this group in the MPA planing process I imagine it is high.|
|California Groundfish Fishermen||Low (1)||With quotas becoming smaller and protected areas becoming bigger, competition is becoming more fierce. While many times members are friends or family, competition is so high that trust is low. Possible higher level trust within Risk Pool groups (need confirmation on this through interviews).|
|California Sanctuary Recreational Users||Medium (2)||Since users may seek conflicting uses of the sanctuary (e.g. extraction vs observation), particularly conservationists may not trust recreational fishers. But often times these groups do not interact and often times they are the same, especially tourists who come to the area to do both.|
|California State and Federal Fisheries Agencies||Medium (2)||CDFW and PFMC groundfish fishery members typically have a high level of trust amongst each other, working toward the same goal under the same guidelines. However, many members of the PFMC management team include stakeholders which often times represent conflicting goals and groups of people (e.g. tribal agency member, Washington vs Oregon vs California states), which can inherently raise a level of caution during deliberations and compromises.|
|California Academic Researchers||Medium (2)||The peer review process allows for formal credibility among members of the group. Since some institutions are associated with particular biases or restrictions (e.g. federal projects vs conservation group projects), trust of conclusions may be lower. However, while conclusions and methods may be debated, the rigorous research process that each project is held to allows for some trust of other members.|
|Australian Fisheries Management Authority||Missing|
|Svalbard Tourism||High (3)||Although group trust is difficult to judge, the evidence of past collaboration and continued operation of AECO suggests that group trust is likely to be high. Literature searches so far have not indicated substantial distrust among members of the group.|
|Wakatobi managers||Medium (2)||No evidence specifically on trust, but NGOs are given a lot of freedom by government (e.g. patrolling) - mainly due to lack of capacity on part of the government and investment in the area by TNC/WWF and their need to achieve objectives. No data on trust specifically. Julian Clifton described it as 'more respect, than trust' (interview June 2015): "local mayor is very influential, and I would imagine the NGOs don’t trust him because they can’t control him, and they have their own agendas in needing to meet their conservation objectives. Respect each other, but not really trust. The mayor is powerful at a local level, but NGOs are connected to the government further up the ladder through the Coral Triangle Initiative – so the mayor can’t antagonise the NGOs - benefits to both if they rub along with each other."|
|Svalbard Resource Managers||High (3)||Although difficult to determine, these actors likely have a high degree of trust.|
|Svalbard Shrimp Fishers||High (3)||From a study not specifically about shrimp fishing, but about fishing more generally in the Barents Sea, Honneland (2000) found that fisherman believed that others would not exceed their quota limits. Since Coast Guard inspections occurred regularly (and violators were punished fairly and without bias), many fishermen held the view that others could cheat without being detected, but “only in small quantities and not over time”.|
|Galapagos Charles Darwin Foundation||High (3)||Likely fairly high, as it is a research community with more or less converging interests.|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Commercial Fishers||High (3)||No evidence was found on level of trust between commercial fishers but group interests are similar and trust is assumed to be high. Trust within members of the CFA appear to be high as cooperation between members is visible from newletters and social media reports.|
|GABMP (Commonwealth Waters) Director of National Parks||Missing||No information was fou The executive team -- Director of National Parks and the 4 senior executives -- meet regularly to address strategic directions and current issues.|
|Cenderwasih fishers||High (3)||Tribes and clans have a long history in the area|
|Australian Toothfish Fishers||Missing|
|Community C||High (3)||4.23/5: This indicates that on average levels of trust in leaders falls between trust more than distrust (4) and entirely trust (5).|
|New Zealand Fishery Managers||High (3)||Generally high. Professional relationship, worked for many years with same parties.|
|New Zealand Arrow Squid Fishers||Medium (2)||Appears to be high. Very professional. Always inter-company rivalry|
|Community A||Medium (2)||3.71/5. This value indicates that on average levels of trust in other members of the community falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4).|
|Community G||Medium (2)||3.46/5: This value indicates that on average trust in other members of the community falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4).|
|Community B||Medium (2)||3.18/5: Levels of trust in other members of the community falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4).|
|Community F||Low (1)||2.77/5: This indicates that average level of trust in other members of the community falls somewhere between Distrust more than trust (2) and Neither trust nor distrust (3).|
|Community E||Medium (2)||3.85/5: This value indicates that average levels of trust in other members of the community falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4).|
|Community H||Medium (2)||3.5/5. This value indicates that on average levels of trust in other community members falls between neither trust nor distrust (3) and trust more than distrust (4).|
|California market squid fishermen||Medium (2)||Generally close family ties. Fishers communicate frequently and mostly share information. Natural competition. Less trust among various areas (other states, different ports) and newcomers to fishery (particularly those from Alaska or Washington).|
|California Department of Fish and Wildlife Market Squid Managers||High (3)||Appear to be on same level.|
|Falkland Islands Government (FIG) Fisheries Managers||High (3)||In management, there are rivals of course, but managers all know each other and generally have trust that they are in it together.|
|Patagonian Squid Trawlers||High (3)||Small community, 20-30 years same people involved, social stigma to do the right thing and be honest with each other. Most of the time any issue is some guy "being an idiot" but not trying to rig the system. Crew: many of them have worked for many years together, no observed conflicts.|
Basic:A basic variable describes essential and basic background information for a component.
Biophysical:Biophysical variables describe just that: important biophysical properties, largely of environmental commons, that are not captured by a more specific theme.
Causation:A variable with this theme describes issues of causality, which is a complex subject. Most basically this theme is associated with variables that describe different types of causation and different types of causes of environmental problems.
Context:contextual variable relates the component with which it associated to the social and/or ecological setting of a particular interaction and/or case.
Ecosystem services:Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or describe the provision of important ecosystem services by a natural resource.
Enforcement:Enforcement involves several different processes, including monitoring for violations of rules, sanctioning violators, and conflict resolution mechanisms involved in this process. Variables that relate to any of these processes should be attached to this theme.
External:Variables with this theme relate a component to processes external to the case with which the component is associated.
Heterogeneity:Variables with this theme describe important ways in which the member of an actor group differ from each other.
Incentives: This theme is associated with variables that are not directly related to institutions and rules, but which still play a role in affecting the incentives that commons users have to ameliorate or exacerbate the commons they use.
Institutional-biophysical linkage:This is a sub-theme of the institutions theme, and describes those variables that ask about the relationship between a set of institutions and a biophysical aspect of a commons.
Institutions:Variables with this theme describe the social institutions (rules, property rights) that are used to organize and direct human behavior. It does not include monitoring and enforcement of these institutions, as these are associated with the Enforcement theme.
Knowledge and uncertainty:Variables with this theme describe levels of knowledge that actor groups have regarding a commons, as well as factors that affect how much uncertainty there is in the status and dynamics of that commons.
Leadership:Leaders play an important role in commons management, most traditionally by providing for public goods needed to organize commons users. But there are other possible roles, and variables associated with this theme can relate to any role that a leader might play in an interaction.
Outcomes:This theme is attached to variables that deal with any outcomes that are produced by the actions of relevant actors in an interaction.
Resource renewability:Variables associated with this theme deal with the ability of a natural resource to be highly productive and renewable.
Social capital:Social capital captures the processes that enable the members of an actor group to work effectively together. Variables associated with this theme describe factors that affect or in some way express the level of social capital among members of a group.
Spatial:Variables associated with the Spatial theme describe important spatial patterns or dynamics, such as the spatial heterogeneity of a commons, or whether or not a user group resides within a particular commons.
Technology:This theme is attached to variables that consider the role that technology and infrastructure have in affecting commons outcomes.