| Summary | ICPR members (after the signature of the Rhine Action Plan; the members are the same but some of the group's properties changed) |
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| Project | SESMAD |
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| Subtype | Nation |
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| Sector | Fresh Water Pollution |
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| Interest Heterogeneity | Medium (2) |
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| Explanation | Polarization of interests between upstream and downstream nations was moderated by a common concern about the political costs of not addressing the pollution problem (increased public awareness after oil spill disaster) as well as common goals of river and salmon restoration (in addition to the pollution abatement goals). |
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| Costs Of Exit | Yes |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Proportionality (Of Costs And Benefits) | Yes |
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| Explanation | The proportionality of costs and benefits was better taken care than in the past (see "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Actor Group Coordination | Both formal and informal |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
In this new group, informal coordination in the form of side agreements between pairs of ICPR members more prevalent than in the past and has been pointed as one of the characterizing features of this period of governance |
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| Leadership | Informal leader |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Leadership Accountability | Low (1) |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Leadership Authority | Medium (2) |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Actor Group Trust | High (3) |
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| Explanation | The moderate heterogeneity of interests and the room left by the governance system (Rhine Action Plan) favored a climate of trust |
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| Past Collaboration | Medium (2) |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Personal Communication | Less than once every 2 years (2) |
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| Explanation | See "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" |
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| Remote Communication | |
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| Explanation | |
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