• Logged in as Unregistered User
  • Sign in

Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database: Component

SummaryICPR members (after the signature of the Rhine Action Plan; the members are the same but some of the group's properties changed)
SectorFresh Water Pollution
Interest HeterogeneityMedium (2)
ExplanationPolarization of interests between upstream and downstream nations was moderated by a common concern about the political costs of not addressing the pollution problem (increased public awareness after oil spill disaster) as well as common goals of river and salmon restoration (in addition to the pollution abatement goals).
Costs Of ExitYes
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Proportionality (Of Costs And Benefits)Yes
ExplanationThe proportionality of costs and benefits was better taken care than in the past (see "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Actor Group CoordinationBoth formal and informal
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)" In this new group, informal coordination in the form of side agreements between pairs of ICPR members more prevalent than in the past and has been pointed as one of the characterizing features of this period of governance
LeadershipInformal leader
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Leadership AccountabilityLow (1)
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Leadership AuthorityMedium (2)
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Actor Group TrustHigh (3)
ExplanationThe moderate heterogeneity of interests and the room left by the governance system (Rhine Action Plan) favored a climate of trust
Past CollaborationMedium (2)
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Personal CommunicationLess than once every 2 years (2)
ExplanationSee "ICPR Nations (1987-1986)"
Remote Communication