| Summary | Nations with veto power in the ICPR, which are also riparian countries of the Rhine |
|---|
| Project | SESMAD |
|---|
| Subtype | Nation |
|---|
| Sector | Fresh Water Pollution |
|---|
| Interest Heterogeneity | High (3) |
|---|
| Explanation | There is a clear distinction between upstream polluters (France and Germany) and downstream users (mostly The Netherlands) |
|---|
| Costs Of Exit | Yes |
|---|
| Explanation | There was high public awareness of the pollution problem in the Rhine |
|---|
| Proportionality (Of Costs And Benefits) | Yes |
|---|
| Explanation | The costs of participating in the ICPR were relatively low; countries did not engage in pollution abatement costs of pollution as part of the ICPR governance system (although they expectedly did it as part of their own and European national regulations. |
|---|
| Actor Group Coordination | Formal |
|---|
| Explanation | Membership in ICPR
|
|---|
| Leadership | Informal leader |
|---|
| Explanation | The Netherlands promoted the inception of the ICPR, and the approval of the Chemical Convention. |
|---|
| Leadership Accountability | Medium (2) |
|---|
| Explanation | Leadership is informal and thus there are not institutional mechanisms to make The Netherlands accountable; however, there are mechanisms of transparency and judicial procedures hosted by the European Union. |
|---|
| Leadership Authority | Low (1) |
|---|
| Explanation | Sovereignty of the countries clashed with the intention of The Neetherlands to push for a stricter Chemicals Convention and its implementation. |
|---|
| Actor Group Trust | Medium (2) |
|---|
| Explanation | There was enough trust to sign the Chemicals Convention but not enough to implement it; lack of confidence among countries in that regard manifested in a too procedural approach to pollution control (black and grey lists of pollutants and their concentration thresholds). |
|---|
| Past Collaboration | Medium (2) |
|---|
| Explanation | A Salmon Commission had been created to control fishing efforts; there was also the precedent of navigation agreements; collaboration was not high, however, as the relatively failure of the Salmon commission shows; this can be related also to the relatively recent II world war. |
|---|
| Personal Communication | Less than once every 2 years (2) |
|---|
| Explanation | This answer applies strictly to the ICPR formal meetings; however, representatives communicate more than once per year in the European Union-related venues |
|---|
| Remote Communication | |
|---|
| Explanation | |
|---|
