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Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database: Component

SummaryNations with veto power in the ICPR, which are also riparian countries of the Rhine
SectorFresh Water Pollution
Interest HeterogeneityHigh (3)
ExplanationThere is a clear distinction between upstream polluters (France and Germany) and downstream users (mostly The Netherlands)
Costs Of ExitYes
ExplanationThere was high public awareness of the pollution problem in the Rhine
Proportionality (Of Costs And Benefits)Yes
ExplanationThe costs of participating in the ICPR were relatively low; countries did not engage in pollution abatement costs of pollution as part of the ICPR governance system (although they expectedly did it as part of their own and European national regulations.
Actor Group CoordinationFormal
ExplanationMembership in ICPR
LeadershipInformal leader
ExplanationThe Netherlands promoted the inception of the ICPR, and the approval of the Chemical Convention.
Leadership AccountabilityMedium (2)
ExplanationLeadership is informal and thus there are not institutional mechanisms to make The Netherlands accountable; however, there are mechanisms of transparency and judicial procedures hosted by the European Union.
Leadership AuthorityLow (1)
ExplanationSovereignty of the countries clashed with the intention of The Neetherlands to push for a stricter Chemicals Convention and its implementation.
Actor Group TrustMedium (2)
ExplanationThere was enough trust to sign the Chemicals Convention but not enough to implement it; lack of confidence among countries in that regard manifested in a too procedural approach to pollution control (black and grey lists of pollutants and their concentration thresholds).
Past CollaborationMedium (2)
ExplanationA Salmon Commission had been created to control fishing efforts; there was also the precedent of navigation agreements; collaboration was not high, however, as the relatively failure of the Salmon commission shows; this can be related also to the relatively recent II world war.
Personal CommunicationLess than once every 2 years (2)
ExplanationThis answer applies strictly to the ICPR formal meetings; however, representatives communicate more than once per year in the European Union-related venues
Remote Communication