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Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database: Component

SummaryICCAT contracting parties that obtain quota to appropriate from the Western Stock of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. This group is dominated by Canada, the US and Japan.
SectorFisheries (Stock-specific)
Interest HeterogeneityMedium (2)
ExplanationInterests among group members vary along several dimensions. For Western members the most significant source of heterogeneity is their role as a consumer (Japan) vs. producer (Canada, USA and Japan).
Costs Of ExitYes
ExplanationAlthough countries may still fish for Eastern ABFT if they leave ICCAT, they would lose legal access to international trade, and the lucrative Japanese sashimi market.
Proportionality (Of Costs And Benefits)Yes
ExplanationThere is some proportionality between contributions to ICCAT and the amount of benefits, however, not included in these costs are the monitoring costs that are performed at the National Level. In any case 4 groups are identified, Parties identified as developed market economies pay the most, while payments by non-developed economies depend upon combinations of their GNP and catches. The poorest countries with catches below 5000t pay 0.25% of the budget each, while countries that exceed GNP of 2,000 or harvest more than 5000t pay 3,00% each.
Actor Group CoordinationInformal
ExplanationThere is no formal organization for Western members, but can coordinate informally.
LeadershipNo leader
Leadership Accountability 
Leadership Authority 
Actor Group Trust 
Past CollaborationMedium (2)
ExplanationThe Canada, US and Japan interact frequently on global governance issues in organizations such as the G8
Personal Communication 
ExplanationICCAT contracting parties meet regularly, but there are no separate meetings for ICCAT Western Members.
Remote Communication