Summary | Shrimp is the most prevalent fishery around the waters of Svalbard. States that are permitted to fish for shrimp in the Svalbard zone are Canada, the EU, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Russia and Norway. |
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Project | SESMAD |
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Subtype | Local Resource User Group |
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Sector | Fisheries (Stock-specific), Marine protected areas |
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Interest Heterogeneity | Medium (2) |
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| Explanation | In general, all fishermen have an interest in making a profit from commercial fishing and having sustainable fish stocks. In the case of Svalbard, there is some heterogeneity due to the conditions in the Svalbard Treaty – that other nations are permitted to fish within Svalbard’s waters. Although the majority of shrimp fishing is by Norwegian vessels, some vessels from others countries also participate, and may be less likely to comply with Norwegian regulations. |
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Costs Of Exit | No |
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| Explanation | With large infrastructure costs for fishing vessels, one might assume that the costs for leaving the industry may be high. However, from the mid-1990s to 2010, there was a trend from many, smaller vessels to fewer, larger vessels (NAFO 2006 ). This likely means that the number of fishers has decreased, and thus costs must not have been too high to leave the industry. |
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Proportionality (Of Costs And Benefits) | |
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| Explanation | The overall value of the Norwegian shrimp fishery (not just Svalbard area) is about 500 million NOK per year ($65 million US) (Statistics Norway [Online ]). Fishing statistics for indicate that for groundfishing as a whole (including shrimp) that revenues have exceeded costs, making it profitable (Fiskeridirektoratet 2015 ). |
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Actor Group Coordination | Missing |
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| Explanation | Unknown |
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Leadership | No leader |
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| Explanation | |
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Leadership Accountability | Not Applicable |
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| Explanation | |
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Leadership Authority | Not Applicable |
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| Explanation | |
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Actor Group Trust | High (3) |
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| Explanation | From a study not specifically about shrimp fishing, but about fishing more generally in the Barents Sea, Honneland (2000) found that fisherman believed that others would not exceed their quota limits. Since Coast Guard inspections occurred regularly (and violators were punished fairly and without bias), many fishermen held the view that others could cheat without being detected, but “only in small quantities and not over time”. |
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Past Collaboration | Missing |
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| Explanation | Unknown |
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Personal Communication | Missing |
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| Explanation | Unknown |
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Remote Communication | Missing |
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| Explanation | Unknown |
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